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TRANSFERRING NORTH CAROLINA REAL
ESTATE PART I: HOW THE PRESENT
SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
DALE A. WHITMAN*

Let me introduce our hero: Tom Taylor, who is newly married and
busy acquiring possessions. He is about to buy two of the most expensive:
a new car and a home.
The car Tom selects is a luxury model from the local dealership of one
of the major auto manufacturers. The price is four thousand dollars.
Tom's ten-year-old clunker suffices for a five-hundred-dollar down payment with the remainder of the price being financed over a three-year
period. The entire transaction is consummated in approximately an hour,
and, of course, neither of the parties is represented by counsel. Tom drives
away in his new limousine having been assured by the dealer that the
certificate of title will arrive from the Department of Motor Vehicles
within a few days.
Later, in the less pressured atmosphere of his own apartment, Tom
examines more carefully the papers he signed. He notes that (as seems
universally true) he is going to pay a bit more than the stated fourthousand-dollar price. Specifically, there is sales tax of eighty dollars ;1 a
title transfer and registration fee of two dollars ;2 and the ubiquitous finance
charge, tantamount to interest, which in the case of Tom's purchase runs
about five hundred dollars. Although the finance charge seems exorbitant
and the sales tax is irritating, Tom observes philosophically that at least
one can hardly complain about a mere two-dollar, charge to assure one's
title to such a large investment.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; Visiting Associate
Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970-71. This article constitutes the first part of a two-part treatment of material from a study conducted by
the author. The second part will appear in the fourth issue of this volume. Financial
assistance for this study was provided by the North Carolina Law Center. The
author expresses his appreciation to Angel Beza and Peter Harkins of the Institute
for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina for their invaluable aid in preparing and processing the questionnaires which form the basis
of this paper.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4 (Supp. 1969).
'N.C. G N. STAT. §20-85 (1965) (the two-dollar figure includes one dollar
that is levied as a driver-education fee.).
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Tom's next major purchase is a residence. This decision seems more
weighty, and Tom and his wife spend several weeks acquainting themselves with the local real estate market. They finally settle on what seems
to them the best compromise of size, design, amenity, convenience, and
price: a five-year-old split-level selling for twenty thousand dollars.
Tom signs a contract to purchase and gives the realtor with whom the
house is listed a one-thousand-dollar "earnest money" deposit. The realtor
offers to help arrange financing, and the local savings and loan association,
after making an appraisal and credit check, commits itself to loan ninety
per cent of the twenty-thousand-dollar price. The commitment assumes
that a private mortgage insurance firm will guarantee to the lender that
the "top twenty per cent" (i.e., the four-thousand-dollar difference
between the fourteen thousand dollars the association would lend without
mortgage insurance and the eighteen thousand dollars they are willing to
loan with insurance) will be recouped if, in the event of foreclosure, the
property does not yield enough to cover the loan's outstanding balance.
Since everyone appears to assume that an attorney will be required to
search the title and handle the sale, Tom is willing to retain one. He is
not personally acquainted with any lawyers, so he asks the loan officer at
the savings and loan association for a recommendation and follows the
suggestion he is given. The attorney he contacts informs Tom that the
deal can be closed in about two weeks. When the date set for closing
arrives, Tom appears at the lender's offices prepared to write a check
for the additional one thousand dollars remaining to be paid as a down
payment on the purchase price. Although the attorney has previously
mentioned that there will be some additional charges, Tom is aghast when
informed that he owes an additional 908 dollars based on the following
statement:
Mortgage insurance premium'
Attorney's fee4

$360.00
225.00

This amount is paid to the private mortgage insurance company and is usually
computed at the rate of two per cent of the loan amount. Some mortgage insurers
give the borrower the option of paying this premium at the rate of one-fourth of
one per cent per year for ten years, but no one has bothered to explain this option
to Tom.
'The attorney has charged in accord with his county bar association's suggested
minimum fee schedule, which calls for an amount equal to one percent of the first
twenty thousand dollars of purchase price and one-half of one per cent of the next
eighty thousand dollars, with an additional twenty-five dollar fee for supervision
of the settlement.
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Title insurance premium5
Appraisal fee
Loan origination fee0
Recording fees
Survey
Transfer tax 7
TOTAL

45.00
25.00
180.00
8.00
45.00
20.00
$908.00

Fortunately, Tom has sufficient savings to cover these unexpected
costs, and the closing is held without incident. That evening, as he and
his wife sit among the packing crates in their new home, Tom broods
about his experience. "The lending institution," he thinks, "is getting
a bit more out of me than their quoted interest figure would suggest.
Financing is usually expensive, but why do all of these charges have to
be loaded on at the front end? When I bought my car, the lender certainly didn't want his finance charges in advance."
Tom's thoughts then turn to the cost of transferring and assuring the
title to his new property. "It seems irrational-the title transfer and protection for my new car cost only two dollars, but those charges for the
house amounted to 343 dollars. I can see why a somewhat greater charge
is justified for houses than cars, but this is ridiculous. Where are the
economies of scale?"
Before attempting to answer the questions Tom has raised, let me add
another chapter to the story. The events described thus far are entirely
typical of transactions repeated with only minor variations thousands of
times each year. But the situation which follows is atypical, occurring in
only a tiny fraction of one per cent of all home purchases. Nonetheless,
The premium for a mortgagee's policy is two dollars and fifty cents for every
one thousand dollars loaned. This rate appears to be uniformly followed by companies writing title insurance in amounts up to fifty thousand dollars in North
Carolina. See LAWYERS TITLE IN S. Co., TITLE INSURANCE RATES (1962); FIRST
TITLE IN S. Co., SCHEDULE OF RATES AND CHARGES (undated). This rate is probably typical of that charged by companies operating throughout the nation under
the "approved attorney" system.
'There is no point in trying to ascribe this fee to any particular service rendered
by the lender. It is in reality a loan discount intended simply to increase the lender's
yield or effective interest. It is limited by statute to one per cent of the amount
loaned. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10 (Supp. 1969).
"Prior to January 1, 1967, a transfer tax of fifty-five cents per five hundred
dollars of purchase price was imposed on real estate transfers by the federal
government. Upon the repeal of the federal tax, a number of states, including
North Carolina, substituted taxes at an identical or similar rate. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 105-228.28-.36 (Supp. 1969). The rate in North Carolina is fifty cents per five
hundred dollars. Id. § 105-228.30.
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its consequences, as illustrated through the following telephone conversations, are instructive:
Hello, counselor? This is Tom Taylor calling. You may recall
representing me in buying that house on Oak Street last month.
Well, I have a problem. There's an elderly lady sitting in my living
room who claims she has the right to live in my house for the rest of
her life. She and her husband apparently lived here several years ago;
now he's dead, and she has some kind of court order which appears to
give her the right to the house. You must have missed this in your
title search, and I hope that you'll get busy and straighten it out immediately.
The attorney is patient but not helpful. He carefully explains to Tom
that the stranger's claim is apparently based on a statutory right similar
to common-law dower." Although he is sympathetic, he has no legal
obligation to come to Tom's aid for at least three reasons: First, his
title opinion was expressly limited to matters appearing in the public land
records, which contained no information about this purported widow of
the prior owner. Second, he cannot be guilty of malpractice since that
would require proof of negligence and he conformed in every particular
to the standard of skill and care of a prudent lawyer; indeed, no degree
of care would have been likely to disclose the instant claim. Third, the
attorney's title opinion was addressed to the savings and loan association,
and not to Tom. Thus, any liability would run only to the lender (if and
when it sustained a loss).
In despair, Tom mutters, "I thought you fellows had insurance to
cover situations like this." He receives another patient explanation:
"The insurance, Tom, is liability insurance. The company will make good
a loss only if the attorney is himself legally obligated to do so-and that
is not the case here." Tom's attorney, in conclusion, suggests that there
may well be legal defenses to the widow's claim and that if Tom wishes to
retain him, the attorney will be happy to investigate them. Tom declines,
not very politely.
Yet hope springs again in Tom's breast. He remembers the title
insurance! Quickly he places a call to the insurance company: "I want to
report a claim." The clerk listens to Tom's story, pauses to locate the file
on his property, and responds with a crushing blow: "I'm sorry, Mr.
Taylor, but the policy you purchased was a mortgagee's policy, not an
'See notes 63-66 & accompanying text infra.
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owner's. It covers only loss sustained by the lender. I'm afraid we can
take no action unless the lender makes a claim based on an actual loss
to it."
This situation is the stuff of which the legal profession's public image
is made, at least in the residential-real-estate field: Custom and law seem
to conspire against the layman to charge him much but to offer him little
protection in return. The attorney's view is, of course, quite different.
But it is undeniable that the present system creates its share of public
resentment and that it fails to offer the degree of economy or protection
we might reasonably expect from a method of conveyancing and title
assurance.
SURvEYING THE SYSTEM

There is plenty of public discontent with the way real estate transactions are handled. The lawyer, of course, is only one of the several
objects of criticism. Many sellers are offended to learn that the broker
takes six per cent of the sales price as his commission; this is particularly
irritating in those instances when the payment of the commission has
the effect of wiping out the seller's expected profit on the sale. Institutional lenders, in these days of high interest and "discount points," fall
under severe criticism from both buyers and sellers. Indeed, compared
with a typical real estate commission or the amount commonly collected
as "points," the attorney's fee seems rather modest. Yet there is an increasing resentment sensed by members of the profession against allegedly
high fees for little service. Some attorneys already fear that unless present
practices are reformed the public will find an alternative to the lawyer's
role in real estate transfers.0
It is the purpose of this article to evaluate these criticisms in a systematic way and to examine specifically the nature and quality of legal services
rendered in North Carolina real estate transactions in relation to the
fees charged for those services.
' Several members of the Real Estate Committee of the North Carolina Bar
Association have expressed this view to the author. Compare the account of the

Arizona lawyer-realtor battle in M. BLOOM, TnE TROUBLE WITH LAwYERs ch. 6
(1968). Bloom's book, written from a trenchant antilawyer viewpoint, has itself
probably been a factor in the declining public confidence in the profession. More
scholarly accounts of the Arizona dispute-which resulted in the approval, by a
four-to-one public majority, of a constitutional amendment effectively excluding
lawyers from routine real estate transactions-are found in Marks, The Lawyers
and the Realtors: Arizonds Experience, 49 A.B.AJ. 139 (1963); Riggs, Unauthorized Practiceand the Public Interest:Arizonds Recent ConstitutionaL Amendinent, 37 S. CAL. L. R!v. 1 (1964).
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When the present study was undertaken, there were virtually no
available data on the way North Carolina lawyers handle real estate
matters."° The author therefore undertook to make a survey of the state's
attorneys. The scope of the survey was not as inclusive as might have
been ideal, but its results are believed to be generally indicative and
representative of practices within the state. The following procedure was
used: A twelve-page questionnaire requesting detailed information about
real estate practice was prepared. The North Carolina Bar Association
had recently appointed a subcommittee to study the role of the lawyer in
real estate transactions, and that subcommittee met with the author several
times to make recommendations and suggest revisions of the questionnaire.
The subcommittee's work was helpful, and the resulting draft of the
questionnaire was surely more germane and coherent than would otherwise have been the case."
Nine North Carolina counties were then chosen as the targets for
distribution of the questionnaires. The counties were selected to offer as
wide a range as possible of geographic and urban-rural settings within
the state.' 2 A mailing list was compiled from sources made available by
the North Carolina State Bar, the North Carolina Bar Association, and
the state Attorney General's office. The list was composed with considerable care with the aim of including on it every private practitioner of
law in the nine selected counties. The resulting list contained slightly less
than one thousand names, or about one-fourth of the licensed attorneys
in the state. Questionnaires were then mailed to all persons on the list.
About four hundred responses to the mailing were received, and about
half, of these were from lawyers who did no real estate work or did so
little that they felt they could not appropriately answer the questions.
Thus, a total of 197 questionnaires remained for study. The data from
them were card-punched and tabulated by computer; the results form the
statistical backbone of the discussion which is to follow.
"OA general survey of North Carolina practitioners was conducted in 1966 for
the N.C. Bar Association, but the information it produced on real estate practice
was minimal. See material cited note 13 infra.
" The author is particularly grateful to Louis C. Allen, Jr., Esq., of Burlington,
North Carolina, chairman of the subcommittee, for his unflagging encouragement
and interest. The views expressed in this article are, however, only those of the
author and not necessarily those of the subcommittee or any of its members.
1 The counties chosen, by geographic distribution, were as follows: EasternCraven, Wayne, Brunswick; Central-Durham, Lee, Richmond; Western-Bun.
combe, Mecklenburg, Wilkes.
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It must be emphasized that no claim of complete generality is made
for the statistics derived from the survey. The nine counties surveyed
were selected arbitrarily with no bias other than to include a spectrum of
statewide conditions. But there was obviously some degree of selfselection by the attorneys who received the questionnaire. It is not
possible to say whether the more than five hundred attorneys who received
questionnaires and did not return them failed to do so because they did
no real estate work, because they had so much (real estate?) work to do
that they had no time to answer questionnaires, or simply because they
forgot. Thus, it is possible that the data would have been somewhat
different if every attorney in the state had been compelled to answer the
questionnaire as fully as possible. Nevertheless, the results of the present
limited survey seem quite valuable. The reader has now been warned of
the statistical perils, and they will not be adverted to again.
The remainder of the first part of this two-part article will be concerned with the actual services attorneys perform in connection with real
estate transfers-specifically title search, the "closing" process, and the
procurement of title insurance. The second part, which will appear in the
final issue of this volume of the North Carolinu Law Reziew, will treat
the ethical and financial problems confronting the real estate practitioner
and will discuss some avenues to reform of the present system. The
survey and this article discussing it necessarily do not deal with many
types of real estate practice. For example, no attempt has been made to
investigate representation in zoning or other land-use proceedings; neither
residential nor commercial leases have been considered; financing of
commercial and income-producing properties is dealt with only tangentially. The major focus of the study has been on the transfer of title to
real property with special emphasis on the transfer of the single-family
home.
The attorneys responding to the questionnaire practiced under a variety
of arrangements. Fifty-five per cent of those responding were partners
in law firms, twenty per cent were sole practitioners, and eleven per cent
were associates employed by an attorney or a partnership. Various other
practice arrangements account for the balance of the respondents. These
proportions are probably quite close to the distribution of practice arrangements among the totality of North Carolina attorneys. 13 The geographical
" See generally, NORTH CAROLINA BAR Ass'N, SUMMARY REPORTr OF NORTH
CAROLINA BAR AssocIATIoN SURVEY OF THE EcoNoMICS OF LAW PRACTICE 1-16
(1966).
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distribution of the respondents is shown in the footnote.14 The responses
appear to represent a group of lawyers with a fairly intensive real estate
practice: the average respondent reported spending 11.6 per cent of his
practice time on single-family home purchases, and an additional 14.4
per cent of his time on other real estate work, for a total of twenty-six
per cent.
The questionnaire drew a sharp distinction, at many points, between
single-family home purchases and other real estate transactions. The
single-family purchase is an ideal vehicle for study since it tends to follow
a standard, repetitive pattern. By contrast, the phrase "all other real
estate work" was defined by the questionnaire as including representation
of builders and developers in acquiring acreage for subdivisions; obtaining
constructiofi and permanent financing for developers; overseeing sales
and leases of rental and commercial property; and obtaining refinancing
or secondary financing of homes (whether or not owner-occupied) when
there is no transfer of title. Clearly there is so much diversity in this latter
category that only rather general information could be acquired about
it in a questionnaire of moderate size.
RESULTS OF TaE SURVEY

Roles, Time, and Fees

The single-family home purchase is the stable and staple business of
many real estate attorneys. Rather surprisingly, our respondents indicated
that home-buyers themselves are the most frequent sources of this business although other sources, almost as productive, are developers or
sellers, lenders, and brokers.15 Typically only one attorney is involved in
2

Brunswick
5
Buncombe
37
Craven
7
Mecklenburg
94
Wayne
11
Wilkes
8
Durham
25
Other
2
Lee
4
Total
197
Richmond
4
15
The questionnaire asked how many real estate transactions had been referred
to the attorney during the preceding twelve months by various parties. The mean
responses were as follows:
Single-fanny
All other real
hone purchases
estate work
By broker
9.5
2.6
By lender
9.4
3.9
By developer or seller
9.4
5.8
By buyer
13.4
7.8
Other
1.8
2.4
Do not know who
selected attorney
2.9
1.3
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the house sale; the median estimate given by our respondents was that
78.9 per cent of such transactions were handled by only one lawyer. The
attorney's activities in a home sale may be broken into two categories:
title examination and the mechanics of closing. Under the category of
"title examination," the attorney will visit the Register of Deeds office
in the county where the land is located and make the customary search of
grantor and grantee indices and books of recorded documents. He will
check with the superior court clerk's office to determine whether any
docket entries or other possible recorded claims impose liens on the land.
He will determine at the appropriate county and municipal offices whether
there are liens existing for delinquent taxes or assessments. He may
examine a survey to determine whether encroachments or easements raise
title problems, and he may go so far as to view the property itself. Under
the heading "the mechanics of closing," the attorney may prepare such
documents as a deed, application for title insurance, title certificate, and
closing statement. He may spend some time in explaining these documents
to the parties, and he will attend a formal closing at which the necessary
instruments will be signed and acknowledged. He will then attend to the
recording of the appropriate documents and their distribution to the
parties entitled to them. The respondents in our survey were asked to
estimate the number of hours attorney's work involved in the various
activities of a single-family-home-purchase transaction. The median of
their responses is shown below:
Preparing & examining abstract of title
Preparing documents
Counselling & negotiation
Attending closing & recording documents

3.6 hours
1.0
.49
.86
6.1 total hours

The figures given, including the figure for "total hours," are only
medians; obviously there is great room for variation from one transaction
to the next. For example, a particular title examination may consume
inordinate time because of multiple parties or parcels involved in the
title chain, apparent missing links, or other problems. In another transaction the title chain may be unusually simple and require only a few
minutes to trace. Similarly, a party to the transaction who seems unusually dense or obstreperous may require a great deal of counselling
and explanation, while another client may be both cooperative and
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sophisticated and therefore require no counselling at all. Moreover, the
hourly estimates given by the respondent attorneys may not be highly
accurate; about three-quarters of the respondents admitted that they kept
records of time spent on single-family transactions only occasionally or
not at all. Nevertheless, the figures given in the table above probably
constitute a fair estimate of the time actually involved in these transactions.
The attorney's fee for this set of services is ordinarily paid by the home
buyer. Ninety per cent of the survey respondents indicated that they
followed the local bar's suggested minimum fee schedule in billing for
single-family-home-purchase services. These fee schedules vary from
county to county but usually provide for a fee of one per cent of the first
twenty thousand dollars of purchase price and a somewhat reduced percentage of the price in excess of the twenty thousand dollars, plus a small
fee for handling the closing-about twenty-five dollars. The attorney
will thus receive a 225 dollar fee for handling the sale of a twentythousand-dollar house, and that price is probably toward the lower end
of the range of housing prices in many communities of the state today.'
If the 6.1 total-hour figure discussed above is fairly representative, the
attorney is earning about thirty-five dollars per hour. Such a figure is not
extraordinarily high, but most attorneys would probably consider it an
adequate level of compensation. The remainder of this part of the article
will examine each of the attorney's functions, along with some specific
topics related to these functions, in this transaction in some detail in order
to discover just what the home buyer is purchasing for the fee he pays.
" Sales prices of homes in the South have tended to run substantially below

the national average. The data for 1968 are:

MedianpriceMedian priceexisting houses
-newhouses
$20,050
$24,700
United States
18,980.
21,500
South
See HUD, 1968 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBooK 67-68. Although North Carolina
cities are among the lowest housing-costs areas of the nation [see Why Housing
Costs are Going Through the Roof, TIME, Oct. 31, 1969, at 88], costs have risen
at a national rate of about eight per cent per annum recently, and North Carolina
prices have probably gone up at least proportionately. See generally House Hunting? Costs Yon Face, City by City, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RFPORT, May 18, 1970, at
81-82. The National Association of Home Builders estimated median 1960 prices of
new homes at 25,000 dollars for the South, an increase of sixteen per cent over the
1968 HUD estimate! See Inflation: A Futile Search For a Home, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 2, 1970, at 1, col. 3 (City ed.). There is little reason to suppose the inflationary trend has abated during 1970.
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The Negotiation Function
Although the median estimate given by our respondents for "counseling
and negotiation" in single-family transactions was .49 hours, it is apparent
that the bulk of this effort goes into counseling. Attorneys are involved
in very little negotiation, for reasons that are not hard to discover.
Our respondents were asked the percentage of single-family transactions
in which they negotiated on the buyer's behalf with the seller before
a contract of sale was signed. The average response was 5.3 per cent of
all transactions. At first blush, this miniscule percentage of negotiated
contracts seems strange in light of the fact that 88.7 per cent of the respondents considered the home buyer to be a client in the transaction.
The explanation, of course, is that in the vast preponderance of cases the
contract of sale has already been executed when the attorney is first consuited. The contract commonly takes the form of an "offer to purchase"
prepared by the real estate salesman on a printed form in the buyer's
behalf and submitted for approval to the seller. With the addition
of the seller's signature, the offer becomes a binding contract. The salesman is exceedingly unlikely to encourage the buyer to consult an attorney
for advice before the offer is submitted since the attorney might suggest
changes (or, as the salesman would say, "flyspeck") that could delay or
deter the transaction. Whether the broker or salesman is engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law by preparing the contract and negotiating its
terms has been a subject of great dispute and much litigation in other
jurisdictions. 17 This matter will be treated in Part II of this article;
for present purposes, it is enough to observe that the contract will probably be fully formed before the attorney sees it, and there is consequently
very little in the way of negotiation to be done with the seller.
Somewhat more remarkable is the response of the attorneys surveyed
when asked in what percentage of single-family transactions they negotiated
on the buyer's behalf with a lender before a loan was made. The average
response was a mere 4.3 per cent of the cases. It is common for the real
estate salesman, with both new and used properties, to arrange a tentative
commitment with a local lender before beginning efforts to sell the
property. But since the salesman's primary interest is in selling the property rather than in assuring the buyer the best possible financing arrangements, there is no reason to suppose that the salesman will exert unusual
effort to arrange the most favorable terms that might be found. Many
"' See, e.g., materials cited note 9 supra.
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home buyers are inexperienced in real estate financing practices and
quite legitimately suppose that their attorneys will be more familiar than
themselves with such nuances as interest rates, discount points, acceleration clauses, prepayment penalties, and the like.
Most attorneys are, in fact, familiar with all of these concepts and
are quite willing to explain them to buyer-clients if asked to do so. But
even the most charitable view of the statistics cited above suggests that
the attorneys of North Carolina are not especially eager to intercede in
behalf of buyers with the lending institutions. This phenomenon might be
explained by the supposition that the attorney does not consider negotiation
with lenders to be his role in the transaction; perhaps he does not do it
because he is not asked to do it; and perhaps the buyer does not ask
him because the buyer is not sufficiently sophisticated to recognize the
attorney's abilities in this sphere. A more probable explanation, and one
that will be explored in some detail in Part II of this article, is that the
attorney considers both the lender and the buyer to be his clients and
feels he cannot properly negotiate in behalf of one against the other. In
all events, it is clear that negotiation on the buyer's behalf is not an
activity which forms a major portion of the attorney's services in the
typical single-family transaction.
The Record Title Search
The fundamental core of "title examination" work takes place in the
Register of Deeds office. The attorney performs basically three activities:
(1) He uses the grantee-grantor index to construct a chain of title, working backward from the present owner. (2) He uses the grantor-grantee
index to determine whether any conveyances were made by persons in the
chain to persons outside which would have the effect of impairing or
destroying the title in the chain. (3) He reads the actual instruments which
his search of the indices has disclosed in order to determine their validity,
correctness of land description, inclusion of the proper parties, and the
like.
The foregoing procedure may not be sufficient in many cases. For
example, it may be necessary to check in the superior court, clerk's office
for probate or intestacy proceedings which fill in apparent gaps in the title
chain. The clerk's office must also be checked for information about
possible judgment liens, mechanics' and materialmen's liens, special proceedings involving members of the title chain which might have affected
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title, public assistance liens, lis pendens, and the like. The activities of the
title searcher in the Register of Deeds office and the clerk's office are
usually quite standardized and routine; it is reasonable to assume that the
vast majority of attorneys performing this work in the state are entirely
competent, and they may be forgiven the natural boredom which results
from such routine and unchallenging work.
Every title searcher must make an important policy decision with
regard to the historical period his search will cover. Obviously, the
attorney does not wish to go further back into the past than is necessary
to assure a "safe" title search since the effort expended is at a minimum
proportional to the period covered. But in many cases adding ten years,
for example, to the period of search will mean considerably more than a
proportional increase in the attorney's work. Several factors account for
this. Instruments recorded during the early part of this century and
before are found in the record books in longhand script and are therefore
more difficult to read than instruments typewritten and photocopied into
the record books by a more modern process. Moreover, the more ancient
instruments are far more likely to raise difficulties in interpretation of
legal descriptions. It is common to find references to "the old oak tree,"
"the large white rock by the creek," and other monuments. These references are at best ambiguous and at worst totally unrelatable to the modem
topography of the land. The title searcher must somehow decide whether
a document containing such language actually affects the title to the land
he is searching. In an important and difficult case, this inquiry may require
interviews with long-time residents or surveyors familiar with the history
of the property. Such problems can arise even with a relatively short
period of title search, but the probability of encountering them increases
greatly as the search period is extended.
The questionnaire asked each attorney how far back in time his
usual title search went in each of two situations: when title insurance is to
be obtained and when no title insurance is involved. The reason for introducing the distinction was that many title insurance companies require
of their approved attorneys a particular search period; sixty years is probably the most common requirement.18
The following table shows the search periods most commonly used
18 See, e.g., LAWYERS TITLE INS. Co., TITLE INSURANCE MANUAL 9 (1962).
At
least one company has begun leaving the search period to the discretion of the
attorneys, evidently in response to some lawyers' practice of making an additional
charge for a sixty-year search. Letter from Herbert L. Toms, Jr., President of
First Title Insurance Co., to the author, Dec. 1, 1970.
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70 years
60
50
40
30

years
years
years
years

Title Insurance
to be obtained
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No Title Insurance

3.7%

2.7%

74.2%
9.5%
4.2%
2.6%

44.4%
11.8%
22.5%
9.6%

by the attorneys answering our questionnaire and indicates the percentage
of respondents selecting each search period.
The table suggests the significant influence that title insurance firms
have over attorneys in the choosing of a search period. When insurance
is to be obtained, nearly three-quarters of the attorneys follow the insurance
firm's suggested sixty-year search. When no insurance is involved, the
sixty-year search becomes much less popular, and most of the attorneys
who forsake it drop back to a forty-year search. This shift may reflect
the view of the attorneys that the title insurance companies are unnecessarily cautious and that a search of something less than sixty years
provides adequate protection.
If the reader suspects that the choice of a search period is merely the
application of a rather arbitrary rule of thumb, he is probably right. North
Carolina has no "marketable title" statute,1 9 nor does it have even a more
limited statu.te that would cut off such ancient nonpossessory interests in
land as rights of entry and possibilities of reverter.20 The only comparable
legislation in North Carolina purports to cut off certain ancient mineral
interests.' Its constitutionality has never been judicially tested, and it
has only a trivial impact on the selection of an appropriate search period.
" Professor James A. Webster's prodigious efforts to procure the enactment of
marketable title legislation have not thus far succeeded. See Webster, The Quest for
Clear Land Titles-Making Land Title Searches Shorter and Surer in North
Carolinavia Marketable Title Legislation, 44 N.C.L. REv. 89 (1965). The North
Carolina Bar Association has recently shown renewed interest in the topic and in
October of 1969 appointed a special subcommittee of the Real Estate Committee to
study it. The subcommittee is presently in the process of drafting legislation for
submission to the North Carolina General Assembly in 1971. Telephone interview
with Charles Rose, Chairman of N.C. Bar Ass'n Real Estate Committee, in Fayetteville, N.C., Feb. 11, 1971.
20 See Webster, The Quest for Clear Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of
Reverter and Rights of Entry?, 42 N.C.L. Rv. 807 (1964).
2
N.C. GnN. STAT. § 1-42.1 (1969). This statute is a syntactical disaster of unparallelled proportions. In its present form it cannot possibly do anyone any good,
and it deserves immediate repeal.
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Nor is it profitable to try to determine the appropriate search period by
analogy to the statute of limitations on adverse possession of realty. The
22
statute (twenty years when the adverse possessor has no color of title
and seven years when he has color of title)- runs only against possessory
interests; therefore no protection is afforded against the assertion of
anciently created future interests, severed mineral estates, or easements.2 4
And the statute's protection is limited to persons who have been in actual
and open possession ;25 the holder of undeveloped land is likely to get no
benefit from it. Nor does the statute run against persons under such disabilities as infancy, insanity, or imprisonment. 6
Thus, there is really no statutory standard upon which to base the
selection of a search period. Clearly, as the period is extended the risk
of failing to uncover an extant title defect is lessened. The relationship
between search period and the probability of undiscovered title defects of
record might be represented by an exponential curve in the following form.

Probability
of
Nondiscovery
of
Viable Record
Title Defects
.

I

I

I

I

a

t

a

*

Search Period (years)
22N.C. GEN. STAT.
"3N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 1-40 (1969).
§ 1-38 (1969).

"Eason v.Spence, 232 N.C. 579, 61 S.E.2d 717 (1950); see N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-42 (1969) (severed mineral estates). See also Brown v.Brown, 168 N.C. 4,
84 S.E. 25 (1915); R. PowELL, REAL, PRoPERT- 1024 (abr. ed. 1969) (future
interests).
"5The North Carolina statute requires possession under "known and visible
lines and boundaries." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-40 (1969). See Mallet v.Huske, 262
N.C. 177, 136 S.E.2d 553 (1964); R. PowELL, REAL PROPERTy 1013 (abr. ed.
1968).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-40 (1969), gives fee title to an adverse possessor "against
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Unfortunately, no data is available (and the author can see no practical way of generating it) which would assign numerical values to the
graph above. Ideally, it would be quite helpful to be able to assert that,
with a thirty-year search period, the probability of an undiscovered defect
would be three per cent, while with a sixty-year search period, the
probability would drop to one per cent. Common sense suggests such a
trend, but the numerical factors are anyone's guess.
From the client's viewpoint, it does seem ironic that where title insurance is to be obtained, the present North Carolina custom also gives
the client the benefit of a longer search period. It is in the opposite case,
where no title insurance is to be procured, that the client has a more
genuine need for the longer search period. If we could be sure that, for
example, a forty-year search period is sufficient to bring the probability of
error down to an acceptably low level, then no complaint could be made
about shortening the search to forty years; but there is no scientific basis
for such assurance.
The majority of attorneys recognize that their title search duties are
not completed in the Register of Deeds and the superior court clerk's
offices. Another obvious step is to determine the currency of city and
county taxes. Our survey assumed that every attorney would make this
check in every case, for failure to do so would be a clear example of
malpractice.2 7 But tax liens are not the only liens which may be imposed
upon real estate by a local government agency. It is common for North
Carolina cities and counties to finance such local improvements as
street and sidewalk paving and water and sewer lines by the imposition
of special assessments. 2 A lien is imposed on the real property benefiting
from the assessment to secure its payment.2 9 Quite frequently the improvement work which has been done is not visually evident, and the
potential buyer may have no reason to suspect that the property is
all persons not under disability." The types of disability are enumerated in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-17 (1969). See Warlick v. Plonk, 103 N.C. 81, 9 S.E. 190 (1889)
(insanity); Clayton v. Rose, 87 N.C. 106 (1882) (infancy). To be immunized

from adverse possession, the disability must exist when the statute of limitations

begins to run. Battle v. Battle, 235 N.C. 499, 70 S.E.2d 492 (1952).
"' Hill v. Cloud, 48 Ga. App. 506, 173 S.E. 190 (1934) ; Zurich Gen. Accident &

Life Ins. Co. v. Klein, 181 Pa. Super. 48, 121 A.2d 893 (1956).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153-294.1-.19 (1964) (assessments by counties for water
and sewage); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-78 to -105 (1964) (assessments by cities for
streets, sidewalks, water, and sewerage).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-294.10 (1964)
§ 160-88 (1964) (city lien).

(county lien); N.C. GEN.

STAT.
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burdened by an assessment lien. The only practical method of discovering
the lien is a check in the relevant city or county office. Rather surprisingly,
about five per cent of the survey respondents stated that they did not
customarily make this check as a part of their title search procedure.
Such a failure would almost surely result in liability of the attorney if it
developed that the property were burdened by an assessment.
A further problem in checking both tax and assessment liens is the
often-haphazard condition of the records of the relevant city or county
office. An attorney wishing to check the state of the taxes may, for
example, be invited to look in the files directly to see if there are delinquencies, or an employee of the office may volunteer to make the check
for him. In either event, there is no assurance that a card or other record
of delinquency may not be misfiled or absent from the files entirely or that
an employee volunteering to make the check will do so carefully. Because
of the general principle that there is no estoppel against the government,
it is generally assumed that the governing body could freely assert the tax
or assessment lien despite the failure of its own records to disclose the
lien at the time the attorney made his title search."° During the 1969
session of the North Carolina General Assembly, the organized bar made
a strenuous effort to get enacted legislation which would have obliged the
tax collector's offices to give binding written statements of the state of tax
accounts on property being searched,3 ' but city and county officers opposed
the bill, and it failed to pass. It is improbable that the negligence of the
tax collector and his employees would be imputed to the searching attorney
in these cases, but the fact remains that the customary form of attorney's
search does not adequately protect the buyer against the risk of delinquent
taxes or assessments.
Discoverable Non-Record Defects
There are a variety of title defects which may be discovered by an
inspection of the property, but which are not disclosed by a search of the
" The imposition and collection of taxes are, of course, governmental functions; and the State cannot, by the conduct of its agents[,] be estopped from
collecting taxes lawfully imposed and remaining unpaid..
Henderson v. Gill, 229 N.C. 313, 316, 49 S.E.2d 754, 756 (i948). The Gill case
involved incorrect legal interpretations of the state sales tax given by state agents
to a retailer, but the result would probably be the same in a case of erroneous tax
delinquency information. See generally 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 147 (1964).
"' Senate Bill 106, which provided for the certification of the existence and
amounts of assessment liens against real property, was postponed indefinitely by
the North Carolina House of Representatives on May 30, 1969. III INsTx ruT oF
GOVERNMENT, DAILY LEGISLATIVE BULLETIN 1025 (No. 98 May 30, 1969).
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public records. These are primarily defects which do not arise from written
instruments and, therefore, to which the recording act does not apply.
Examples include adverse possession, encroachments, prescriptive easements, and leases running from their making for three years or less. 2
The surveyed attorneys were asked whether they customarily viewed the
property to check for such outstanding rights. Fourteen and four-tenths
per cent replied that they did in single-family-home-purchase transactions,
and 25.7 per cent stated that they did so in other transactions involving
title search.
It is, of course, understandable that busy attorneys would prefer not
to spend the time necessary to view personally every property as a part
of the title-search procedure. Yet the inescapable fact is that matters
which may seriously affect title can sometimes be discovered only by
physical inspection. Perhaps an adequate alternative is an indication to
the buyer of the matters to observe and questions to ask in order to
disclose such title defects. But it is doubtful that very many attorneys
take the time to educate buyers on these matters.
Other matters, while perhaps not technically title defects, are so closely
allied with title that the typical buyer probably expects the attorney to
have found them acceptable. These include compliances with zoning and
subdivision ordinances and housing and building codes.3 Problems in
these areas are much more likely to arise with commercial or incomeproducing property than with single-family homes in tract developments.
For example, it is quite unlikely that a tract housing development would
be constructed with improper zoning on the property;84 similarly, it
would be unlikely that a builder would ignore a subdivision ordinance
since the plat of the subdivision would not ordinarily be accepted for
recordation by the Register of Deeds until the necessary governmental
2Unrecorded
leases running from the time of their making for three years or
less are valid against subsequently-recording purchasers. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18
(1966).

" Failure of a prior owner to comply with subdivision regulations was held
not a title defect in Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 37 Cal. 2d 644, 234 P.2d
625 (1951). The same conclusion would be likely with other police-power regulations.
' Builders must obtain building permits prior to commencing construction.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-122 (Supp. 1969) (city). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9
(52) (Supp. 1969) (county authority to appoint building inspector). The building
inspector would not ordinarily issue a permit for a nonconforming structure. However, problems sometimes arise as to nonconforming uses of homes. These problems typically involve commercial uses of homes: a beauty-shop operation, an
architect's studio, etc. The careful attorney will ask the buyer about such intended
uses and verify their legality.
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approvals had been obtained. 35 Building and housing code violations are
perhaps somewhat more frequent among single-family houses, both because of deterioration of older houses and because homeowners frequently do work which they categorize as "home improvement" but which
is in fact in violation of local codes. Such "bootleg" improvement on
houses can often be discovered simply by advising the buyer to ask the
seller if any improvement work has been done,36 but it is doubtful that
many attorneys make a practice of bringing up this matter.
Note that there are several levels at which these police-power problems may exist. If the violation of an ordinance has been cited by city
or county officials, a check of the local government's offices may reveal
it.3r But if the violation exists and has not been discovered by local
officials, it is likely to be turned up only by personal investigation by the
buyer, lender, or attorney. Plainly the attorney is in the best position to
see that this investigation is done.
The respondent attorneys evidently agreed that zoning, subdivision,
and code compliance was a less important feature of title searches of singlefamily homes than of commercial properties. Forty-six per cent replied
that they customarily checked the zoning on single-family homes, while
seventy-seven per cent did so in commercial transactions. Forty-eight per
cent checked compliance with subdivision ordinances in single-family home
transactions, and for commercial transactions that figure rose only to
fifty-seven per cent.3" Code violations were deemed less important than
either zoning or subdivision compliance by the respondents: thirteen per
cent checked for code violations with single-family homes, and twenty9
eight per cent made such checks in commercial transactions.

"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-266.4 (1964) (county approval); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160-226.2 (1964) (city approval). It is illegal, but certainly not impossible, for

an unapproved plat to be recorded.
" This technique has the added advantage of sometimes disclosing unfiled
mechanics' and materialmen's claims.
"' But an official statement that no violation exists will probably not bind the
enforcement authorities. See note 30 supra, and accompanying text.
N
Note that commercial and industrial property may well be subject to subdivision ordinances. "Subdivision" is defined generally as:
all divisions of a tract or parcel of land into two or more lots, building
sites, or other divisions for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of
sale, or building development....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-226.6 (1964)

(1964)

(cities). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-266.7

(counties).

" Since some of the less populous counties to which the questionnaire was sent

have no zoning, subdivision ordinances, or building codes, the attorneys were asked
only what procedures they followed when the ordinances did apply.
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The differential suggested by these figures between single-family
home transactions and commercial transactions is arguably justifiable
because of the greater probability of violations in commercial and industrial structures. At the same time, the results are ironic in that the
commercial-transaction buyer, who is most likely to be sophisticated and
careful to avoid local ordinance violations, gets the greater protection from
his attorney in pinpointing such violations, while the more naive singlefamily home buyer is left to fend for himself. Again, the attorney's minimum duty here would appear to be a detailed explanation to the client of
the nature of possible ordinance violations and the procedure the client
should go through to check for them.
Personal Property and Fixtures
Nearly every piece of improved real estate sold has closely associated
with it items which are, or once were, chattels.40 The presence of these
articles raises two issues of consequence to the title searcher: (1) Will
they pass to the purchaser of the real estate, and (2) if they do pass, will
they be subject in the purchaser's hands to security interests imposed on
them prior to the transfer?
Let me pose a case for analysis of these problems. Owens, who owns
his home, decides to remodel the kitchen. As part of the project, he purchases from the local Sears, Roebuck and Co. store a drop-in electric
range. This range is designed to fit into a pre-cut counter space, and when
in place it gives the appearance of being built-in, but, in fact, only its own
weight holds it in place. Its only other connection with the house is its
short electrical cord, which plugs into a wall outlet underneath the cabinet. Owens signs an installment contract with Sears agreeing to pay for
the range over a two-year period.
A year later, Owens lists his house for sale, and it is purchased by
Peters. The range remains in the house, and Peters assumes he now owns
it, but there is no written memorandum or bill of sale referring to it.
Shortly after the sale closes, Owens discontinues making payments on the
range to Sears; his lack of interest in continuing the payments is, if not
forgivable, at least understandable. Peters is distraught when Sears personnel arrive to repossess the range. He calls the lawyer who handled
the home purchase: "How could this happen?" he cries.
"A sampling of such items in the average home might include television antenna, curtain rods, curtains and drapes, carpeting, disposal, washer, dryer, dishwasher, range, refrigerator, water heater, furnace, plantings, wall-hung cabinets,
and various racks and shelves.
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Observe that the first of the two issues mentioned above is not raised
by the facts of the hypothetical. If Owens had attempted to remove the
range before Peters took possession of the house, the dispute between
them would raise the first issue, and that issue would typically be analyzed
in "fixture" terms: If the range is designated a fixture by the court,
it would pass with a deed to the realty; if it is not a fixture, but merely a chattel, the realty deed would not affect it. In the latter case,
unless the fixture was mentioned in the contract or a separate bill
of sale covering it was executed or some other agreement to transfer
it can be found or invented, Owens may keep the range. 4' Such a
seller-buyer dispute is a tribute to the carelessness or ignorance of the
parties and the real estate salesman, none of whom took the trouble to
enumerate in the sales contract which items went with the house. Since
the lawyer is so rarely involved in the transaction until the contractnegotiation stage is over, he cannot be blamed for the disagreementalthough a thoughtful attorney might have saved the buyer some grief by
suggesting, even after the contract of sale had been signed, that before
closing the parties walk through the house and perpare a list of the items
to pass with its sale.
But let us return to the hypothetical case in which a claim to the
range is made, not by Owens, but by Sears, the installment seller. Even
if the contract is clear in purporting to pass the title to the range to
Peters, does he take it free of Sears' security interest? And if he does not,
is the presence of that interest a risk to which Peters' attorney should have
alerted him before the sale of the house was consummated? Indeed, is
there any reasonable way Peters or his attorney could have learned of the
prior interest (remembering that a fellow like Owens is not likely to
disclose it voluntarily) ?
These questions must be answered by reference to the same issue
discussed in connection with the Owens-Peters dispute above: is the range
a fixture? The relevance of the fixture classification lies in the fact that
section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies only to fixtures
and further provides that the "fixture" concept is defined, for code purposes, by non-code state law.42 One should not assume from this reference
"Jenkins v. Floyd, 199 N.C. 470, 154 S.E. 733 (1930); Home v. Smith, 105
N.C. 322, 11 S.E. 373 (1890).
,2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-313 (1965). The usual state definition of "fixture"
contains three elements: (1) some physical connection of the item with the land;
(2) the "adaptation" of the item to the real estate; and (3) the intent of the
annexer that the connection be permanent. North Carolina formulations have tended
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that the non-code law is likely to put easily to rest the question whether a
drop-in range is or is not a fixture ;43 quite the contrary. The law of fixtures
is in North Carolina (as in many states) a pitiful morass of apparently
contradicting and disorganized precedents.44 Indeed, the range in this
hypothetical is an example of an item which might as easily be categorized
to ignore the "adaptation" element. See, e.g., Ingold v. Phoenix Assurance Co.,
230 N.C. 142, 145, 52 S.E.2d 366, 368 (1949):
Whatever is so firmly affixed or annexed to the freehold as to become

thoroughly and substantially a part of the realty cannot afterward be removed
except by him who is entitled to the inheritance ....
The trend of modern
decisions has tended to relax the rigidity of this common law rule so that
now, subject to certain limitations, the intent of the parties as evidenced
by their contract, express or implied, is controlling.
See generally R. PowELL, REAL PROPERTY 1 651-60 (Rohan ed. 1970) ; Horowitz,
The Law of Fixtueres in California-A Critical Analysis, 26 S. CAL. L. REV. 21
(1952).
"A major problem with the UCC's reference to state fixture law is that state
courts are called upon to draw fixture/chattel distinctions in a wide variety of contexts which quite properly require the weighing of different factors. Among the
types of cases in which the North Carolina Supreme Court has considered fixture
classification are the following:
1. Does the item pass by a deed of the land? See cases cited note 41 supra.
2. May a tenant remove the item upon termination of the lease? Springs v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 205 N.C. 444, 171 S.E. 635 (1933).
3. May a conditional seller remove the item upon the default in payments of a
tenant-purchaser? Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Carolina Bowling Alleys,
204 N.C. 609, 169 S.E. 186 (1933).
4. Does a tenant have an insurable interest in the item? Ingold v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 230 N.C. 142, 52 S.E.2d 366 (1949).
5. May a purchase-money mortgagee of the disputed item obtain a deficiency
judgment with respect to it? Fleishel v. Jessup, 244 N.C. 451, 94 S.E.2d 308

(1956).
6. What are the rights in the item of a remainderman following a life tenancy?
Overman v. Sasser, 107 N.C. 432, 12 S.E. 64 (1890).
7. What are the rights of a realty mortgagee in the item? Brown v. North Carolina
Joint Stock Land Bank, 213 N.C. 594, 197 S.E. 140 (1938).
8. Is the item subject to real property taxation? Ex parte Makepeace, 31 N.C. 91
(1848).
It seems fatuous to suppose that a simple definition of "fixture" such as that quoted
in the preceding note could satisfactorily solve such diverse issues. And since these
issues generate divergent lines of authority, to which line should one turn when
seeking a classification for purposes of UCC § 9-213 ? The Code is silent on this
point.
'" [I]t is not always easy to determine what are and what are not such
fixtures as to become a part of the realty and pass as a part thereof under
a conveyance or a transmission of the real estate.
Woodworking Co. v. Southwick, 119 N.C. 611, 616, 26 S.E. 253, 254 (1896). The
matter was put more pungently by the Washington Supreme Court in Strain v.
Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 695, 172 P.2d 216, 218 (1946):
[E]very lawyer knows that cases can be found in this field that will support
any position that the facts of his particular case require him to take.
"[T]here is a wilderness of authority ....
Fixture cases are so conflicting
that it would be profitless ... to review ... them."

1971]

NORTH CAROLINA REAL ESTATE

(after protracted litigation) a fixture as not." Thus, the solution to our
problem must be presented in the alternative.
If the range is (by hindsight) a fixture, section 9-313 yields the following result: Peters will take free of the security interest of Sears only if
he purchases the real estate for value, without knowledge of Sears' interest, and before Sears perfects its interest. As originally enacted, section
9-313 stipulated that perfection of a security interest in a fixture could be
accomplished as against persons acquiring interests in the real estate only
by filing a financing statement or other instrument in the office of the
Register of Deeds of the appropriate county, and the Register of Deeds
was instructed by the Code to file such instruments in the manner of
recording mortgages. But this language was stricken by amendment in
1967 for no easily discernible reason. However, a similar result46 appears
to flow from section 9-401 (1) (b), which provides that:
' No North Carolina decision has been found which comes close to resolving
the drop-in range case. Perhaps the most direct authority is Dunn v. Assets
Realization Co., 141 Ore. 298, 16 P.2d 370 (1932), in which electric ranges in an
apartment house were held not fixtures in a dispute between the conditional seller
of the ranges and a mortgagee of the realty. An Oregon statute protected the
realty mortgagee as to fixtures unless the conditional sale contract was recorded.
But the ranges in Dunn were not built-ins, and the court emphasized that "[i]t
was not necessary to alter the construction [of the building] to receive them. ..
Id. at 303, 16 P.2d at 372. Cf. Builders Appliance Supply Co. v. A. F. John Constr.
Co., 253 Ore. 582, 455 P.2d 615 (1969), involving a dishwasher installed in a well
cut-out below a formica kitchen counter, but not screwed into place. It was attached
to water and drain lines by tubing and to the house's electrical system by conduit.
The court held this to be a fixture and therefore lienable by the materialman.
Other cases involving gas ranges or stoves have usually held them not fixtures
in a variety of contexts. See Daniger v. Hunter, 114 Cal. App. 2d 796, 251 P.2d 353
(1952) (unit containing stove, sink, and refrigerator not a fixture for mechanic's
lien purposes); Hanson v. Vose, 144 Minn. 264, 175 N.W. 113 (1919) (gas stoves
held not fixtures in dispute between ground lessor and assignee of installing
tenant); Orbon Stove Co. v. Schroeder, 241 App. Div. 832, 271 N.Y.S. 242
(1934) (gas stoves held not fixtures in contest between conditional seller of stoves
and realty mortgagee); Modern Security Co. v. Thwaites, 138 Misc. 469, 246
N.Y.S. 405 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (same); State v. Feres, 228 Ore. 273, 365 P.2d 97
(1961) (gas ranges not fixtures for eminent domain purposes). Contra, Peed v.
Bennett, 114 Ind. App. 412, 52 N.E.2d 629 (1944) (gas stove held a fixture so as
to pass under realty deed). None of these cases appears to involve drop-in ranges,
which are a recent phenomenon.
"'The result is not quite the same, for the following reasons: Under the UCC
as originally enacted, the fixture interest would have been indexed in the mortgagormortgagee index, just as if it were an ordinary real estate mortgage. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 25-9-313 (4) (c), 25-9-403(4) (1965). But by virtue of the deletions from
both of these sections prior to their effective date in 1967, and the addition of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 25-9-403 (4) (a)-(d) (Supp. 1969), the financing statement is now
required to be indexed only in the index to financing statements maintained by the
Register of Deeds-an index that is separate from that maintained for real estate
mortgages.
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(b) when the collateral is goods which at the time the security interest
attaches are or are to become fixtures, then [filing is proper] in the
office where a mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed
or recorded.
Thus, Sears can adequately protect its interest against Peters only by
filing a financing statement or other instrument evidencing the interest
in the office of the Register of Deeds, and if it is thus filed, Peters' attorney
will discover it in the course of an ordinary title search.47
Let us turn now to the alternate possibility: that the kitchen range will
not be deemed a fixture by the courts. It seems inescapable that the range
would then be considered "consumer goods,' 48 and section 9-302 (d) permits perfection of a purchase-money security interest (such as that of
Sears) in consumer goods without the necessity of filing a financing
statement. However, section 9-307 permits a subsequent purchaser of
the goods who pays value and has no knowledge of the prior interest (such
as Peters) to take free of it unless the secured party has filed a financing
statement.49 Again, according to section 9-401 (1) (a), the place for proper
filing is with the county Register of Deeds.
The conclusion we have reached is that whether the range is or is not
categorized as a fixture, the attorney's search of the records in the Register
of Deeds office is a sufficient protection for Peters against undisclosed
security interests. There are, however, at least two complicating factors
that limit the generality of the conclusion thus drawn. First, even though
the title search protects Peters adequately, does it also protect the lender
who grants a new loan to finance Peters' purchase of the house? If the
range is deemed a fixture, the lender has the same protections as Peters
himself since the definitions of "purchase," "purchaser," and "value" in
section 1-201 make it perfectly clear that the lender is a "subsequent pur"Provided that the "ordinary" search includes a check of the financing statement index in the Register of Deeds office.
,'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-109 (1965): "Goods are (1) 'consumer goods' if
they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes ......
'°Section 9-307, N.C. GEN. STAT. §25-9-307 (1965), has been construed to give
this benefit to the subsequent purchaser only if both he and his seller held the
property as "consumer goods." Thus, if Owens had used the property for rental
purposes before selling it to Peters, Peters would be bound by the security interest
despite his use of the goods for household purposes. See New England Merch.
Nat'l Bank v. Auto Owners Fin. Co., 355 Mass. 487, 245 N.E.2d 437 (1969);
Everett Nat'l Bank v. Deschuiteneer, 109 N.H. 112, 244 A.2d 196 (1968); Muir
v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 108 N.J. Super. 586, 262 A.2d 33 (1970).

1971]

NORTH CAROLINA REAL ESTATE

chaser for value of any interest in the real estate," and this is the operative
language of the fixtures section, 9-313.
On the other hand, if the range is considered "consumer goods"
rather than a fixture, the protection granted Peters by section 9-307(2)
arguably does not extend to Peters' institutional lender since that section
benefits only .those who buy for their "own personal, family, or household
purposes." When we recall that section 9-302 allows perfection of a
purchase-money interest in consumer goods without any filing at all, there
appears to be no practical way for the new institutional lender to discover
such interests even though it may be subject to their priority." The title
attorney is blameless in these circumstances; the most we might expect
of him is that he ask the seller of the house if any of the items passing with
it are subject to installment contracts.
The institutional lender's position is improved if the security interest
to which the range is subject was imposed, not in a purchase-money transaction, but to secure an independent loan from a finance company, for
example. Under these facts, the interest of the finance company could be
perfected, according to section 9-302, only by filing a financing statement,
and the standard title search would disclose the interest.
Another factor not previously considered may be illustrated by
changing our basic case in a different way. Assume that the house in which
the kitchen range is located is owned by Owens, not as a personal residence,
but as income-producing rental property, and further assume that Peters
is buying the house for the same purpose. If the range is a fixture, the
analysis above is still valid; but if it is not a fixture, it is probably not a
"consumer good" either since that designation should be limited to items
5 My colleague,
Professor Richard Smith, argues that this interpretation is not
inevitable. If the consumer protected by section 9-307 were to sell the range to a
non-consumer, would not the transferee be protected on the ground that he has
acquired the consumer's "clear" title? If so, should not the consumer's freedom
from the prior lien also be "transferable" to a chattel mortgagee of the range or,
as in the present case, a mortgagee of the house to which the range is attached
(assuming the mortgage language is broad enough to cover it) ? Professor Smith
suggests that it is desirable to cut off inquiry into what ultimately happens to the
collateral at some definite time-and the most convenient time is the instant after
purchase by the section 9-307 consumer. To put it another way, the buyer can
hardly be said to be "free" of the security interest unless he can freely transfer
and mortgage his goods.
Sears could, of course, avoid this result by the simple expedient of filing a
financing statement instead of relying upon section 9-302, N.C. GEM. STAT. § 25-9302 (1965) ; filing would alert both the section 9-307 consumer and his mortgagee
of the prior interest. If it declines to do so, arguably the defeasance of its rights
by section 9-307 should be broadly construed.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

held by persons who will themselves use the goods primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.51
If the range is not a consumer good, it is all the clearer under section
9-302 that perfection of Sears' security interest can be accomplished only
by the filing of a financing statement-but now the place of filing may
have changed. Section 9-401 provides that, for interests in items which
are neither fixtures nor consumer goods, filing shall be in the office of
the Secretary of State
and in addition, if the debtor has a place of business in only one county
of this State, also in the office of the register of deeds of such county,
or, if the debtor has no place of business in this State, but resides in
the State, also in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which
he resides.
The quoted language is fraught with unanswered questions: What about
the debtor who has places of business in two different counties? What
about places of business which have nothing to do with the collateral
property? Is an apartment building a "place of business"? If so, what
about a single one-family rental house? The only safe procedure, when
rental property is involved, is a check by the title attorney of the financing
statement files maintained by the Secretary of State.
Moreover, the definition of "consumer goods" 2 does not really make
it clear whether the test is to be applied to the goods in the hands of
Owens, Peters, or both. Arguably goods can switch in and out of the
"consumer" category with changes of ownership and uses." Caution
would suggest the necessity of searching the Secretary of State's files
whenever the real estate being transferred has had or will have a use other
than as a personal residence by either the seller or the buyer. Although
our survey questionnaire did not request information from title attorneys
11 See lit re Sam's Furniture & Appliance Stores, 1 U.C.C. Rptr. 422 (W.D. Pa.
1962) (bankruptcy referee); United Gas Improvement Co. v. McFalls, 18 Pa.
D.&C.2d 713 (C. P. Lancaster County 1959).
2See note 48 supra.
" Cf. N.C. GmrT. STAT. § 25-9-109 (1965), Comment 2:
Goods can fall into different classes at different times; a radio is inventory in
the hands of a dealer and consumer goods in the hands of a householder.
Logically, the relevant time to test the "consumer-ness" of the goods (in deciding
the propriety of the place of filing) is the date of the filing-probably a few days
after the original sale by Sears to Owens. But if the goods were originally used
by Owens personally and Sears erroneously filed with the Secretary of State, would
a later shift by Owens to rental use of the goods "cure" the filing? No authority
has been found on the point, but such a position does not seem absurd.
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regarding their efforts to disclose personal property security interests, it
seems unlikely that many of them make the search of the Secretary of
State's files when the circumstances above indicate that this should be
done.
The entirety of the foregoing analysis may be summarized quite
briefly: A search of the financing statement index in the office of the
Register of Deeds will protect both realty buyers and lenders from preexisting security interests in both fixture and non-fixture items, except
(1) real estate lenders arguably are not protected in the case of nonfixture consumer items subject to purchase-money security interests and
cannot 'be protected by any search, and (2) if the real estate has been or
is to be used as other than the residence of the owner, a search in the
Secretary of State's files is also necessary to protect non-fixture items.54
Other Non-Record Defects
Although the foregoing discussion has pointed out a number of ways
in which the typical attorney's record search in the single-family real estate
transaction leaves something to be desired in terms of title assurance, there
is another fairly lengthy list of possible title defects which neither a search
of the public records nor an inspection of the property, however careful,
will disclose:
1. Without delivery a deed passes no title.55 The fact that the deed is
recorded may or may not indicate a valid delivery, depending on whether
the recordation was procured by the grantor with the intent that it constitute a delivery. 0
2. Forgery of an instrument is not cured by its recordation; the instrument is entirely void. 7
3. The incapacity of a deed grantor--due to insanity or other mental
' The title attorney might argue that these exceptions are of no consequence to
him since his task is merely to certify title to real property and since both of these
exceptions relate solely to non-fixture items-not realty by definition. The argument is disingenous since no one-not the courts or the lawyers, much less homebuyers and lenders-can identify with any certainty which items are fixtures. The
title attorney ought to fulfill his client's reasonable expectations or else make an
explicit disclaimer of doing so. The former course seems more in keeping with
a profession devoted to public service.
"Vinson v. Smith, 259 N.C. 95, 130 S.E.2d 45 (1963) ; Fortune v. Hunt, 149
N.C. 358, 63 S.E. 82 (1908).
" Corbett v. Corbett, 249 N.C. 585, 107 S.E.2d 165 (1959); Ballard v. Ballard,
230 N.C. 629, 55 S.E.2d 316 (1949).
" 3 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.58 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) ; R. POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY 885 (abr. ed. 1968).
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defect, infancy, or the like-may impair the effectiveness of his instruments.58 A check of the lunacy dockets may turn up information
about the grantor's capacity, but it may well not since there is no reason
to suppose that most cases of adult incapacity are adjudicated. Similar
problems arise with instruments executed under duress" or undue influence" or fraud in the execution. 6 '
4. If the chain of title includes links of devolution upon death, there is
the possibility that an unprobated will will later be offered for probate
or that previously undisclosed heirs will appear and make claims to the
land.
5. Under the North Carolina statute which substitutes for commonlaw dower and curtesy, a surviving spouse may claim a life estate in onethird (measured by value) of the decedent's real estate, despite the fact
that he sold the property in question before his death; it is only necessary
that the decedent-spouse have owned the property at some time during the
marriage. 6 3 Thus, it is possible that a surviving spouse will appear who
did not join a conveyance made by her spouse during his lifetime and
whose existence is not even suggested by the deed in question.0 4 In order
to make such a claim, the surviving spouse must make several preliminary choices which are probably not commonly made ;05 nonetheless,
the possibility certainly exists and would be especially attractive to a sur"8Thompson v. Thomas, 163 N.C. 500, 79 S.E. 896 (1913) (recordation does not
validate deed made without capacity). See Hendricks v. Hendricks, 272 N.C. 340,
158 S.E.2d 496 (1968), for a discussion of the elements of capacity to make a deed.
Harshaw v. Dobson, 67 N.C. 203 (1872).
Lee v. Ledbetter, 229 N.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 634 (1948).
"Mills v. Dunk, 263 N.C. 742, 140 S.E.2d 358 (1965) ; Nixon v. Nixon, 260
N.C. 251, 132 S.E.2d 590 (1963) (deed procured by fraud in factum passes no

title to innocent third parties).
" The law in such situations is inordinately complex; it is sufficient here to
observe that the innocent purchaser from an estate is not adequately protected. A
thorough discussion is found in Note, Wills-Ghosts in North Caroli a-The

faunting Problem of the After-Discovered Will, 47 N.C.L. Rav. 723 (1969).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (1966).
"This was the case in Petta v. Host, 1 Ill. 2d 293, 115 N.E.2d 881 (1953).
There the court held the surviving wife's claim subordinate to that of an innocent

purchaser for value from the husband, but there is no assurance that North Caro-

lina courts would take this view.
"'She must first dissent from the decedent's will; but this right is not available
unconditionally. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1 to -3 (1966). Then she must elect
not to take the fee simple intestate share provided by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-14 or
-21 (1966). And, finally, she must apparently choose between a life estate in onethird (measured in terms of value) of all real estate under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30
(a) (1966), and a life estate in the dwelling house of the decedent and her at the
time of his death under N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-30(b) (1966). These rights are
available to a surviving spouse of either gender.
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viving spouse in the situation where the estate was heavily burdened by
the claims of creditors. 6
6. Adverse possession need not be evidenced by a recorded document 67 and is not always evident from a visual inspection of the property.
For example, an adverse claimant might have occupied the property for
the requisite time period and then abandoned it; clearly, once he has
acquired the title, later abandonment will not divest him of it unless
another adverse claimant moves onto the land and the prescriptive period
runs anew.

68

7. Mechanic's liens under North Carolina law need only be filed
within four months of the time the work on the property was completed.""
Thus, it is entirely possible for a buyer of improved real estate to complete
a purchase in the belief that the title is clean and then, a month or two
later, to find himself faced with a lien filed by an unpaid workman hired
by the former owner. In some cases, the cautious buyer will request and
receive a lien waiver before completing his purchase, but there is always
the possibility that a particular unpaid workman or supplier will remain
undisclosed and therefore not be invited to sign the waiver form.
Neither the author nor anyone else with whom he has discussed this
matter has any realistic estimate of the frequency of occurrence of the
types of title defects listed above. Some are obviously quite rare; others,
such as the mechanic's lien claim, probably crop up with significant frequency. But to the buyer who has been stung by a particular defect, the
frequency is irrelevant. He only knows that the protection he thought
was inherent in the attorney's search has turned out to be vacuous and
impotent. Reputable attorneys are often fond of saying (and have frequently told the author) that, when such cases arise, they are more than
willing to pay off the outstanding claim despite their apparent lack of
legal obligation to do so. Such an attitude on the part of practitioners,
whether based on motives of charity or a desire to maintain one's professional reputation, is highly creditable, but it is a poor substitute for a
"' The life estate thus obtained is free of most claims of the decedent's creditors.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30(g) (1966).
See 3 Am. JuR. 2d Adverse Possession § 243 (1962).
Klaar v. Lemperis, 303 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1957) ; Mugaas v.Smith, 33 Wash. 2d
429, 206 P.2d 332 (1949) ; Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 450 (1950). See Morse v. Freeman,
157 N.C. 386, 72 S.E. 1056 (1911) (adverse possession prevails over record title).
A dictum apparently to the contrary in Ricks v. Batchelor, 225 N.C. 8, 33 S.E.2d
68 (1945), can probably be safely disregarded since the court did not have the
adverse possession problem in mind.

"N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 44A-12(b) (Supp. 1969).
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well-defined route of legal recourse to the client: first, because not every
attorney who does title work is likely to take such a generous view of
his own responsibility; second, because the attorney's generosity is likely
to be ihversely proportional to the size of the claim, with a complete failure
of title to a valuable tract of land likely to result in an attorney's reevaluation of his noble intentions; and third, because it is both untidy
and unseemly to rest a system of title assurance on such an ill-defined and
casual foundation.
The Title Certificate
It is appropriate at this point to inquire into the nature of the
representations made by the attorney in his title opinion and to ask to
whom those representations are made. Our questionnaire survey furnishes
some data on the second point. The respondent attorneys were asked, "In
transactions involving the making of a new loan, to whom is your certificate of title customarily addressed?" The attorneys were asked to
respond separately with respect to single-family home purchases and with
regard to other transactions involving title search. The single-family
purchasers did not fare well. In such transactions, seventy-one per cent
of the attorneys responding addressed their title certificates only to the
lender, while nine per cent addressed the buyer and nineteen per cent
customarily named both the buyer and lender. The buyers of incomeproducing property fared somewhat better; about fifty-two per cent of
them would receive a title certificate either jointly with the lender or
independently. The question stipulated a transaction in which a new loan
was being made. Presumably in cases where an old loan is assumed or
the entire purchase price is paid in cash, the attorney would always send
his title certificate to the buyer.70
Thus, based on our questionnaire respondents' customs, fewer than
thirty per cent of single-family home buyers obtaining new loans get a
title certificate addressed to themselves. It seems exceedingly doubtful
that a buyer would be permitted to recover against an attorney for malpractice in the attorney's preparation of a certificate addressed only to
the lender,71 but recovery is not inconceivable. Perhaps a theory based on
"0Note, however, the probability that in many cases involving no new loan,
there will be no title search at all or perhaps only a search back in time to the
date on which the most recent full search was made. Realtors probably encourage
this practice as an economy measure in many loan-assumption sales.
" There is a discernible tendency of the bar to assume the primary lawyer-client
relationship is between attorney and lender. See N.C. State Bar Ethics Opinion No.
715 (July 17, 1970) (attorney's duty of confidentiality owed to lender).
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justifiable reliance, third party beneficiary, or something of the sort could
be constructed. An even more intriguing matter is the content of the
certificate itself. Our questionnaire respondents were invited to mail
to the author copies of the title opinion or certificate forms they customarily used. Forty-two of the respondents in fact returned their title
certificate forms for analysis. Nearly all of the forms begin with a statement in the following form:
This is to certify that I have examined the public records of Durham County relating to the following described real property ....
After identifying the property, the certificates then go on to express an
opinion as to the state of the title:
In my opinion, marketable fee simple title to the subject property is
vested in John A. Doe, subject to the following exceptions ....
A title certificate in this form seems on its face incompetent unless the
exceptions listed include every one of the possible non-record title defects
discussed above. Indeed, many of the certificates do mention some of the
non-record defects discussed above, but there seems to be no consistent
thread running through them. The items most commonly listed as exceptions include zoning and subdivision controls, building and safety codes,
mechanic's and materialmen's liens, and matters which would be revealed
by survey. Very few of the certificate forms received even mention all
of these exceptions.
About two-thirds of the forms, however, purport to exculpate the
issuing attorneys from non-record defects, in a way different from an
express exculpatory clause, by adding to the language of the second paragraph quoted above a phrase such as: "so far as disclosed by the records,"
"based on my examination," "based on the public records," or the like.
Such a phrase, properly drafted, appears to relieve the attorney of responsibility for non-record defects in a much more adequate way than
the attempted listing of such defects as exceptions to the certificate's
coverage. A more difficult question is whether a court would construe the
initial paragraph which says, in effect, "I have examined the public
records," as similarly exculpating the attorney for liability for non-record
defects on the ground that the certifying attorney obviously does not intend
to guarantee that which he has not examined. Resolving this question
requires us to consider the nature of the liability that an attorney may
incur as a result of issuing a title certificate.
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Despite the fact that the attorney-client relationship frequently flows
from a contract of employment, the courts have uniformly treated the
attorney's liability as arising under tort law. 72 The issue is whether the
attorney is guilty of professional negligence, often called "malpractice."
Attorney negligence cases are frequently analogized to those involving
physician malpractice, although there are some important distinctions. 7
The standard of care was articulated by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Hodges v. Carter:
Ordinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of law and
contracts to prosecute an action in behalf of his client, he impliedly
represents that (1) he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill
and ability necessary to the practice of his profession and which others
similarly situated ordinarily possess; (2) he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him; and (3) he
will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use
74
of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his client's cause.
Although no reported North Carolina case has dealt with the application
of this standard of care to an attorney's title certificate, the principles
enumerated in Hodges are typically found in cases involving title search
in other jurisdictions. 75 The American cases make some point of saying
that the attorney is not a guarantor of the accuracy of his title certificate
and is liable only for errors so serious as to violate the standard of care
and skill expressed in Hodges.7 6
It thus seems likely that an attorney will not be held liable for an offrecord title defect regardless of whether or not his title certificate contains
such exculpatory language as "based on the public records." For even
without such a phrase, the attorney may well argue that, because attorneys
in his state or community 77 generally do not check for off-record defects
" See Citizens Loan, Fund & Savings Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E.
1075 (1889).
See Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice,43

'239 N.C. 517, 519, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1954).

IND.

L.J. 771 (1968).

See Palmer v. Nissen, 256 F. Supp. 497 (D. Me. 1966); Hill v. Cloud, 48

Ga. App. 506, 173 S.E. 190 (1934); Wlodarek v. Thrift, 178 Md. 453, 13 A.2d
774 (1940); Sullivan v. Stout, 120 N.J.L. 304, 199 A. 1 (1938); Zurich Gen. Acc.
& Life Ins. Co. v. Klein, 181 Pa. Super. 48, 121 A.2d 893 (1956). See generally
Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1389 (1920).
See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stout, 120 N.J.L. 304, 199 A. 1 (1938).
7,In medical malpractice cases the relevance of local practice is clearly established, but in legal malpractice the geographic extent of the "community" of practitioners against whom the defendant's conduct will be gauged is not so narrowly
defined. See Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 772, 781
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(and indeed in many cases there is no practical way to do so), his personal search methods are not less adequate than those of the legal
fraternity in general, and thus he cannot be held to have violated the
standard of professional care. It appears fairly common in other jurisdictions for defendant attorneys in malpractice actions to offer as witnesses
other attorneys from their communities who will testify that the defendant's
handling of the matter is no different than that which could have been
expected from any good attorney under the circumstances."8 The admissibility of such testimony seems unobjectionable, and it is clearly
relevant to the issue of negligence, but hardly dispositive.
For example, in Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co., 9 the attorney submitted an application to the title company for insurance, representing that
he had made a search of the public records. Because of the unusual amount
of land sales activity in the county, the attorney had in fact not searched
the public records but had relied upon the tract book of a local abstract
company which was, to the attorney's knowledge, six weeks out of date,
a fact of which the title insurance company was never adequately apprised. The attorney's report omitted an outstanding mortgage which
the title insurance company was later obliged to satisfy. The company
then filed an action for malpractice against the attorney. In defense, the
attorney raised the custom among lawyers in the community during the
period in question of conducting their title searches in precisely the way
involved in this case. The court was not impressed. It held the attorney
liable despite his conformity to the custom of his peers, observing that
if the negligence is clear, it is no defense that a whole group of lawyers is
guilty of it.
But this case is surely an extreme example; what result would be
reached if the custom of reliance upon six-week-old abstract books were
of long standing and statewide usage in Florida? Gleason offers only
a slim ray of hope for the North Carolina realty buyer who finds himself
subject to an off-record title defect his attorney's search did not cover.
In Gleason the certificate was a fairly clear misrepresentation of the search
performed; by contrast, the certificates used in North Carolina mis(1968), which argues that a more rigid locality standard should be enforced against
attorneys than physicians. See generally Cohen, Confronting Myth in the American
Legal Profession: A TerritorialPerspective, 22 ALA. L. Rzv. 513 (1970).
"8 See, e.g., Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 378 S.W.2d 655 (1964); Olson v.
North, 276 II. App. 457 (1934).
, 300 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1952), damages modified on rehearing, 317 F.2d 56
(1963).
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represent the scope of the search performed only subtly, if at all." The
bar's practice of omitting search of non-record defects, while simultaneously failing to discuss the omission with the buyer, is probably too
widespread and well-ingrained to be successfully attacked.
Heavy reliance upon custom as an exculpating factor is also suggested
by the fact that the title certificates submitted by attorneys to the author
uniformly omitted any mention of the period of search. Perhaps the
omission is motivated by a desire to avoid explaining to the client why
the attorney chose forty years, rather than sixty or two hundred, as the
appropriate search period. Most laymen probably assume, in the absence
of a contrary statement, that the search has extended back to the original
title in the state. Since neither statute nor any published bar title standard
fixes a search period in North Carolina, prudence would seem to dictate
the mention of the search period on the face of the certificate; but the
attorneys are probably correct in believing that, if their practice is close
to that of their peers, they will be safe from liability.
A further problem with recovery for malpractice in title searches is
the tort statute of limitations, s ' which is universally held to begin to run
when the title opinion is delivered rather than when the title defect is later
discovered. s2 Although the majority of defects probably turn up within a
few years after transfer of title," the statute will insulate the attorney from
those which do not. In this respect, the attorney's personal liability is
hardly an ideal title assurance vehicle.
As indicated above, a large proportion of attorneys do not include
"0On the other hand, the typical home-buyer is much less likely to be wary of
the attorney's guile than was the title insurer in Gleason. Arguably this fact
justifies closer scrutiny by the court.
81Rather surprisingly, no North Carolina case appears to discuss the limitation
of actions for legal malpractice. Evidently applicable is the three-year statute "for
any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not
hereafter enumerated." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5) (1969). See Shearin v. Lloyd,
246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957): "The period prescribed for the commencement of an action for malpractice based on negligence is three years from the time
the cause of action accrues." Shearin involved medical malpractice and thus is not
direct authority for the present problem.
" Sullivan v. Stout, 120 N.J.L. 304, 199 A. 1 (1938); Annot., 118 A.L.R. 215
(1939).
83 See Deatly, One Man Looks at Public Regulation,42 TiTLE NEws 5, 9 (No. 3,
1963):
The experience of my company ... is that over eighty percent of our losses
arise within five years of the policy date and 90% within ten years but that
we occasionally have losses which arise more than 25 years after the assumption of the risk.
If this experience is representative, a three-year statute of limitations will cut off
a significant proportion of all claims.
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the single-family home buyer as an addressee of the title certificate. It
seems likely that many buyers in such cases assume (though the assumption is unjustified) that even though they have received no formal certificate from the attorney, nevertheless he has searched the title for the
buyer's benefit and has found no problem with it. Our questionnaire
therefore asked the attorneys whether, if their title certificates were
addressed only to the lenders, they customarily advised buyers that they
-bad no title opinions addressed to them. Only thirty-five per cent of
the respondents in this category said they pointed out to the buyer his
lack of a title opinion, although eighty-six per cent said they would
willingly provide a certificate for the buyer if he requested one. Of course,
such a request is unlikely if the buyer is unsophisticated and does not
realize that a written opinion is necessary to protect him. MVioreover, of
those attorneys responding to the questionnaire who did not customarily
send a certificate to the buyer, thirty-six per cent said they would make
an extra charge for supplying a certificate to the buyer; typical charges
ranged from ten dollars to thirty-five dollars. Title attorneys would
probably explain the additional charge by pointing out that a certificate
to the buyer as well as the lender generates a somewhat greater risk to
the attorney than a certificate to the lender alone. Yet it is precisely this
risk that the layman buyer frequently (but erroneously) supposes has
already been assumed by "his" attorney.
Malpractice Insurance as Title Protection
Attorneys have frequently cited to the author the prevalence of
liability or malpractice insurance as a justification for confidence in the
present North Carolina method of title assurance. Yet the existence of
malpractice insurance has only a minor impact on the adequacy of title
assurance for two reasons: first, because liability insurance is not universally carried in adequate amounts and, second, because its protection
becomes operative only when the attorney's personal liability can be
established. In the questionnaire respondents were asked about their
professional liability insurance; eighty-five per cent replied that they carried
such insurance, but only seventy-nine per cent had coverage for errors
and omissions in real estate title searches.84 This discrepancy is explained
"' These figures offered by real estate lawyers are much higher than those for
the profession as a whole. The Insurance Rating Board has recently estimated that
about half of the 214,000 American lawyers in private practice today carry malpractice insurance; this figure indicated that a major increase has occurred within
the past fifteen years. Lawyers Face More Suits from Clients, Los Angeles Times,
Dec. 10, 1970, Part X, at 7, col. 1.
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by the fact that some of the companies writing such insurance exclude
the coverage of title searches unless the insured attorney purchases a rider
to the policy at an additional premium; apparently, some attorneys who
do real estate work (hopefully, those who do only a little of it) have
concluded that the additional coverage for title searches is not worthwhile.
Thus, more than twenty per cent of our respondents have no insurance to
cover title search errors.
Also interesting is the breakdown of coverage limits. The most
popular coverage among the insured attorneys responding to the questionnaire was one hundred thousand dollars, selected -by forty-three per
cent of the insured attorneys. Eighteen per cent of the insured attorneys
had coverages of one million dollars or more, while twenty per cent
had coverages of fifty thousand dollars or less. This last category seems
most significant since real estate transactions involving an excess of fifty
thousand dollars in value are common, even in the single-family home area.
Indeed, the popular one-hundred-thousand-dollar policy is totally inadequate coverage for many commercial transactions.
A more pervasive limitation on the usefulness of the liability policy
as a title assurance device is illustrated by the following language, typical
of policies in use in North Carolina:
Coverage. To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon
him by law for damages resulting from any claim made against the
insured arising out of the performance of professional services for
others in the insured's capacity as a lawyer.... 85
Obviously the malpractice insurer is liable only if the attorney is liable;
thus, the policy adds not one whit to the buyer's protection against those
off-record defects for which the attorney himself will be free of liability.
The same is true of on-record defects appearing in the record at so early
a date that they fall outside the normal time-period of title search coverage, of those discovered so late that the statute of limitations bars a malpractice claim, and of all defects asserted against a buyer to whom a title
certificate never ran. No criticism of the insurers is intended here; nevertheless, the nature of the malpractice policy is such that its only benefit
" Pilot Fire and Casualty Co., Lawyers Professional Liability Policy. This
company has policies outstanding which insure betveen eight hundred and nine
hundred North Carolina lawyers. Letter from A. A. Ramont, Second Vice President
of Pilot Fire and Casualty Co., to author, Nov. 5, 1970.
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to the buyer is as a hedge against the possible insolvency or unavailability
of the lawyer.
Title Insurance-Usageand Attitudes
A title insurance policy is a contract by which the insurer agrees to
indemnify the insured if the title to real estate is not as stated on the face
of the policy and if the insured suffers loss as a result of the discrepancy."0
Two types of policies are in common use: the owner's policy, by which
the owner of the real estate is insured, and the lender's or mortgagee's
policy, which insures the party holding a lien on real estate to secure a
debt.
It has been suggested that title insurance companies might write
policies on a "casualty" basis; that is, the company might take few pains,
or none at all, to examine or verify the state of the title before writing the
policy and might charge sufficiently large premiums to enable it to cover
the substantial claims which the company might expect as a result of
such an operating policy.8 7 In reality, the author knows of no title
insurance company writing such policies, and any such company might
incur serious opposition to this procedure in those states, such as North
Carolina, where the power to regulate the insurance industry is taken
seriously by state governments. 8 Certainly, the vast preponderance of title
insurance companies make careful investigation of the title to land on
which a policy is to be written. 9
Several diverse procedures are used by American title insurance
companies to determine whether the state of title to a particular property
is an acceptable underwriting risk. In California, several other western
states, New York City, Chicago, and Cleveland, for example, the larger
title insurance companies maintain their own "plants"-sets of abstracts,
" See generally F. ROBERTS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF TITLE INsURANcE Co PANIES AND ABsTRAcTERs 4-13 (1961); Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J.
492 (1957).

"
See Note, Title Insurance: The Duty to Search, 71 YALE L.J. 1161 (1962).
" See generally RoBERTs, sipra note 86.
"' Indeed, the efforts of title insurers to investigate and except from coverage
every discoverable risk have led some to charge that no insurance is actually involved since no risk remains. The charge is overdrawn, see ROBERTS, supra note 86,
at 6, but it is undeniable that losses through payment of claims are quite small.
See Jensen, 1969 Profit Average Again at 13 Per Cent, 49 TITLE NEWS 6 (No. 12,
1970) (losses of a group of reporting companies were 4.2 per cent of premium income) ; Johnstone, supra note 86, at 501, 518-20 (losses generally in two per cent
range). On the other hand, operating expenses tend to run much higher than in
other types of insurance firms. See Jensen, supra (operating expenses in 1969 were
82.8 per cent of operating income).
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indices, and maps which essentially reproduce in the title company's offices,
the data that would be found in the public records.90 These title plants
are usually indexed by tract rather than grantor and grantee, a metlhod
which allows a very rapid and efficient search. The information contained'
in these title plants makes them extremely valuable, and many title companies have recently been involved in computerization and microfilmingprograms to safeguard and make more efficient their title-plant operationsY1
A second method by which title insurance companies determine the
state of titles they insure is the abstract system. 2 This method, used predominantly in the midwestern states, depends on the existence of private
abstract companies which, for a fee, will produce an abstract of title to a.
particular piece of property. The abstract is simply a collection of summaries of the recorded documents which affect the property's title. A title
insurance company might rely directly on an abstract furnished by such
a company, or it might prefer to act instead on an attorney's opinion,
which in turn would be based upon the attorney's review of the abstract.
In states in which the abstract system is used, it is a common custom for
the seller of real estate to be obligated to furnish a current abstract to the
buyer prior to closing. The abstract to a particular property will be passed
on from owner to owner and updated by the abstract company each time
a new sale of the property occurs.
Neither of the foregoing methods is used in North Carolina by title insurance companies. Indeed, many believe that the preparation of abstracts
or the maintenance of a title plant by anyone other than a licensed attorney
would constitute the unauthorized practice of law in this state.'- There is,
of course, the possibility that a title company wishing to commence a title
plant operation would hire salaried attorneys to do this work, thereby
0 See Zerwick, Creation and Maintenance of a Title Plant, 46 TITLE NEws 2"
(No. 3, 1967).
"' Several articles on electronic data processing of title information appear in
48 TITLE NEWS (No. 7, 1969). See also Lowry, Modern Machinery for the Snal
Office, 48 TiLn NEws 102 (No. 1, 1968).
"0See generally 1 FLIcK, ABSTRACT AND TITLmE PRACTIcE (2d ed. 1958).
" This belief is apparently based on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-2.1 (1965), which
defines the practice of law as including "performing any legal service for any other
person, firm, or corporation specifically including.., abstracting or passing upon.
titles." But presently all title insurers "[pass] upon titles" with impunity, and
their abstracting is hardly a greater violation of the statute. Arguably, such
activities are not "for any other person." Indeed, N.C. Gm. STAT. § 58-134.1
(Supp. 1969) expressly authorizes title insurers to "invest... in abstract or title
plants." Surely insurers may use plants they may buy or build.
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presumably avoiding the statute's prohibition, but the title insurance companies operating in North Carolina have so far made no move in this
direction. Instead, the customary modus operandi in North Carolina is
a conventional title search of the public records by a private attorney,
following which the attorney files an application for insurance with the
desired title company. 4 The application is in reality a certificate of title
(and, in fact, a more carefully drawn one than is used by many attorneys
in certifying title in non-insured transactions). The title company's
employees examine the attorney's application, and if it appears satisfactory, a preliminary binder is issued. This document serves as a commitment on the company's part to write a policy if, following the closing
of the transaction, the title is verified to be as stated in the application.
The attorney conducts the closing, down-dates his title search to the
moment of recording the closing documents, and files with the title company a verification that the application's information is valid. The company then mails the actual title policy to the insured parties.
The above narrative makes clear the attorney's preeminent role in title
assurance in North Carolina, even in cases where title insurance is also
obtained. It should be carefully noted that this is not a universally
applicable principle. In other locales where title insurers operate their
own title plants, the companies place no reliance on attorneys' certificates.
In such states, it has been common to use title insurance, not as a supplement to the attorney's work, but as a substitute for it. It has been estimated, for example, that in southern California ninety per cent of all real
estate transactions are closed, and title insurance issued, without the
intervention of an attorney for any party. 5 In such a setting, the title
company's policy serves in lieu of the attorney's certificate, and a commercial escrow company (often the title insurance company itself) performs the function of supervising the closing, which in North Carolina
is in the attorney's hands.
If North Carolina attorneys are aware of the use of such techniques
in other states, it might not be surprising to find among them some level
of suspicion or even animosity toward title insurers. Although the data
collected in the survey do not suggest that real estate transactions form
" Each company maintains a list of attorneys which it regards as sufficiently
competent to be relied upon; it will accept applications only from these lawyers. The
method is thus sometimes called the "approved attorney system." Young attorneys
who do not enter established firms have sometimes complained about the difficulty
of getting onto the approved list.
" Brown, The Lawyer's Prescription,30 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEws 1, 7 n.3 (1964).
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an extraordinarily profitable segment of most attorneys' practices,90 the
income is nonetheless fairly consistent and stable, and one can well imagine
the reluctance of the average attorney to yield up that segment of his
practice to the title insurance companies.
On the other hand, title insurance can do for the attorney's client what
no other method of title assurance discussed above can accomplish: it can
protect against non-record defects. Forgery, faulty recording or indexing,
lack of a grantor's capacity, rights of surviving spouses-all these defects
and many others are insured against by the title company. In fact, the
only types of defects we have mentioned in this article which are excluded
from the 1970 policy form of the American Land Title AssociationT are
those created by the police power-that is, the exercise by governmental
entities of zoning powers, subdivision control, building-and-housingcode prerogatives, and the like-and by eminent domain." s
The real estate attorney is thus placed in a position of divided loyalties,
if not outright conflict of interest. If he does not recommend an owner's
"' About three out of five lawyers felt single-family home transactions were
less profitable than other legal work, but three out of four felt that non-singlefamily real estate work was at least as profitable as other phases of law practice.
" The 1970 ALTA form contains the latest in a series of changes broadening
coverage. These changes appear to have resulted principally from pressure brought
by large financial institutions which purchase mortgages on the secondary marketprimarily life insurance companies and the Federal National Mortgage Association.
See Roberts, Urban Conveyancing Techniques in Amterica: The Story Behind Title
Insurance, 27 CONVEY. & PRoP. LAW 240 (1963). From the viewpoint of these institutions, a broad, uniform mortgagee's title policy is essential to the fungibility
and liquidity of mortgage investments. No such pressures have come from the
beneficiaries of owners' policies, but the ALTA has for the sake of simplicity made
similar changes in the owner's policy form. See Baughman, FNMA and the Title
Insurance Industry, 43 TITLE NEws 112 (No. 1, 1964); Howlett, Report of the
Standard Title Insurance Forms Committee, 49 TITLE NEws 22 (No. 1, 1970).
" It is, of course, possible that some title insurers will continue to use older,
more narrow forms" or will add exclusions which the 1970 ALTA form does not
contain. For example, by excluding coverage of unfiled mechanics' liens, matters
of survey, rights of those in possession, or the like from the forms, insurers may
cause such terms to become negotiable points-if the attorney for the buyer or
lender is willing to negotiate with the insurance company. An additional problem
area, which the 1970 form does not solve, grows out of the policy's exclusion of
"[d]efects ... not known to the company and not shown by the public records, but
known to the insured claimant . . . ." Suppose the insured knows certain facts

(e.g., the existence of a ditch along the rear property line) but does not realize
that they have title significance (e.g., that the ditch may be a prescriptive easement). See also Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 537 (1964) (construction of exclusion for
rights of parties in possession); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 527 (1964) (exclusion for
defects created or suffered by the insured). A full listing of the old exclusions,
many of which no longer appear in most policies, is given in Putnam, What Your
Title Policy Does Not Protect Against, 37 TiTLE Nnws 25 (No. 6, 1958).
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policy to his client purchasing real estate, he is leaving the client unprotected in significant ways, while the client probably supposes that the
attorney's record title search provides full assurance of title. But if the
attorney, acting out of loyalty to his client's best interests, recommends
a title insurance policy, he may be strengthening the hand of the very
entity that will someday try to replace him in the conduct of real estate
transactions. A major goal of our questionnaire survey was to investigate
the attitudes and behavior of attorneys faced with these competing interests.
We must note initially that in many transactions, some contact with
title insurance companies is unavoidable since certain lenders require that
mortgagee's policies be issued on every real estate loan they make. Our
respondent attorneys were asked what percentage of lenders in their localities customarily required a mortgagee's title policy. On single-family home
loans, the average estimate for savings and loan associations was twentyfive per cent; for banks and mortgage companies, seventy per cent. This
difference is principally explained by the fact that banks and mortgage
companies resell their loans on the secondary mortgage market to the
Federal National Mortgage Association or other institutional investors,
such as insurance companies, much more frequently than do savings and
loan associations. Secondary purchasers of mortgages almost invariably
require a title policy on every loan they purchase; indeed, the presence of
wide title insurance has been an essential ingredient in the development of a
national secondary mortgage market. 9 Savings and loan associations, on
the other hand, usually retain their mortgage loans in their own portfolios. Some of these associations have concluded that title insurance is a
worthwhile protection, while others have not seen fit to require it, a
decision probably encouraged by their private counsel. The average
figures given by our respondent attorneys suggest that lenders are somewhat more likely to require mortgagee's policies in connection with loans
on commercial or income-producing property. The average estimates given
by our respondents on such transactions were thirty-one per cent for
savings and loan associations and seventy-three per cent for banks and
mortgage companies.
Perhaps the most serious problem raised by the presence of a mortgagee's policy in the transaction is the probability that the purchaser of
the real estate will assume the policy protects him, an assumption sometimes fostered by attorneys. No one who seriously analyzed the situation
"' See Baughman, supra note 97.
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would suppose that the buyer's equity in the property is protected by a
lender's policy. 10 But there is at least a surface plausibility in the belief
that the lender's policy will discharge the indebtedness in the event of a
title failure, thereby preventing any loss to the buyer beyond his equity.
Yet on closer analysis, even this apparent protection is vitiated by the
subrogation clause in the title policy,' at least if the buyer is personally
liable on the mortgage debt (as he usually will be in North Carolina) .102
For if the title failure is sufficiently serious to cause the buyer to cease
payment on the loan, the title company will discharge the debt or purchase
the mortgage for the amount remaining to be paid on it and may then
proceed to enforce it personally against the buyer. 103 The deed of trust
form signed by the buyer will doubtless contain covenants of title running
to the trustee and beneficiary,0 4 thus appearing to inculpate the buyer for
'"The face amount of the lender's policy will be the amount of the debt, not
the price of the property. The title company's liability declines steadily as payments
on the loan reduce its principal balance.
...
The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled to all rights and
remedies which such insured claimant would have had againt any person or
property in respect to such claim had this policy not been issued....
ALTA Loan Policy-1970, Conditions and Stipulations, Article 10, Subrogation
Upon Payment or Settlement. The general concept of subrogation, in a context unrelated to title insurance, is recognized in North Carolina. See Peek v. Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., 242 N.C. 1, 86 S.E.2d 745 (1955).
...
The North Carolina anti-deficiency legislation, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38
(Supp. 1969), bars deficiencies only on mortgages or trust deeds given "to secure
to the seller the payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property"
(emphasis added). Deficiency judgments are permitted on loans by third-party
lenders. Thus, unless the note and trust deed stipulate against personal liability
(an uncommon arrangement except in certain transactions involving incomeproducing property), the buyer's liability will survive a foreclosure that does not
bring an amount sufficient to satisfy the debt.
...No case has been found involving precisely these facts. In St. Paul Title
Ins. & Trust Co. v. Johnson, 64 Minn. 492, 67 N.W. 543 (1896), a builder obtained
a construction loan and covenanted not to allow mechanics' liens to arise which
would be superior to the construction mortgage. When mechanics' liens were filed,
the lender's title insurer discharged them and was then permitted to recover that
amount from the builder. The case seems distinguishable from the present situation
on the ground that the builder was at fault in Johnson, while in the context discussed in the text, the title failure is beyond the owner's control. Where the title
company purchases the note and trust deed from the lender, the company's right
to recover from the house-buyer seems clear even without reference to a subrogation theory.
"' For example, the habendum clause of the FHA trust-deed form in use in
North Carolina contains the following title covenants:
[the trustor covenants] that he is seized of the premises in fee and has the
right to convey the same in fee; that the same are free and clear of all
encumbrances and that he will warrant and forever defend the premises
unto the... [trustee] ... from and against the lawful claims of all persons
whomsoever.
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the title failure. In cases where the buyer has been evicted by the holder
of paramount title, personal enforcement of the debt against him by the
title company seems harsh indeed, and perhaps some companies would
elect not to enforce in order to avoid bad publicity or because the buyer's
assets were too meager to justify the effort. But from a strictly legal
viewpoint, there seems to be no impediment to the recoupment of the title
company's loss from the buyer.
Unless he is warned by counsel, it seems most unlikely that the typical
home-buyer will suspect this risk. He has paid for a title insurance policy
(assuming his lender requires one) and quite naturally expects to be
covered by it. In such a case, involving a single-family home purchaser
and a mortgagee's policy, it is especially crucial that the attorney point
out the availability and cost of an owner's policy and the fact that a
lender's policy does not cover the owner. Yet only sixty per cent of our
respondent attorneys said that they customarily explained this situation
to the buyer. Without such an explanation, only a tiny, fraction of buyers
is likely to recognize the need for a separate owner's policy.
A considerably smaller portion of the real estate bar actually encourages
the purchase of owner's title insurance. Only nine per cent of our
respondents customarily encouraged single-family home buyers to obtain
such polices; another nine per cent encouraged their purchase if a lender's
policy were already being required. The attorneys were much more active
in encouraging the purchase of owner's policies on commercial or incomeproducing property. In these cases, twenty-six per cent encouraged the
purchase in all events; an additional thirteen per cent encouraged the
purchase if a lender's policy were required. The attorney's willingness to
push title insurance harder in commercial transactions is understandable
in light of the greater loss to be incurred as a result of title failure; yet it
is again ironic that the clients who are most likely to have a sophisticated
understanding of the risks involved are the very clients the attorney is
most solicitous to protect.
The respondent attorneys who did not customarily encourage the
purchase of owner's title insurance were asked their reason for not doing
so. The questionnaire contained a list of possible reasons, with the
attorney given the option of writing in a reason not mentioned on the list.
The most common reason, given by fifty per cent of the attorneys, was
that insurance "adds so little to the protection already afforded by my
title search and certificate." The second most popular reason, checked by
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thirty-six per cent of the responding attorneys, was "it is not my role to
sell title insurance." A related reason, checked by twelve per cent of the
attorneys responding, was that the "cost is too high."
Whether the title policy in reality adds "so little" to the protection
afforded by the attorney's search is, in the ultimate analysis, a matter of
individual judgment. Scant published data exist on the relative frequency
of various types of title claims and defects, and since many such claims are
settled without litigation and thus do not become matters of public record,
it is difficult to see how such data could be readily generated without full
disclosure by the title companies. 10 5 Nonetheless, we have previously
suggested a long list of possible title defects and claims which the
attorney's search will not disclose but which are covered by an owner's title
policy. 1' Based on this list, it seems a reasonable estimate that the additional protection afforded by the title insurance beyond that given by the
attorney's record search is of roughly the same order of magnitude as the
increment of protection afforded by the attorney's search over and above
mere reliance upon a warranty deed with no search or insurance involved.
If this assumption about the incremental value of title insurance is sound,
the title policy, far from being too costly, is quite a bargain; for its cost
in the usual single-family home purchase is only about one-fourth of the
attorney's fee. That fee covers other legal services in addition to title
search, but the search comprises well over half of the attorney's time
spent in the typical home-purchase transaction. 10 Viewed in this light,
the title insurance premium appears to buy a material amount of protection at quite a modest cost. 0 s And this is especially true when a lender's
.05
Officials of two major west coast title insurers have told the author that
several of the larger companies have in recent years begun to collect such data
internally, but that it could not be disclosed to non-employees. A committee of the
ALTA has attempted to assemble industry-wide claims data by category by claim,
but has made little progress because of the diverse procedures used by individual
companies in reporting data. An official of a large California company told the
author that the three largest categories of claims paid in a recent year (in order
of decreasing total size) were (1) mechanic's liens, (2) erroneous insurance of
lien priority resulting from an incorrect interpretation of the law of subordination
agreements, and (3) search errors.
1.
See text accompanying notes 55-69 supra.
207 See text at note 16 supra.
108 This is not to suggest that title premiums should not be reduced. In only a
few states is there public regulation of rates. See RonEars, supra note 86, at 249.
While the companies do not seem to make outrageous profits, see Jensen, supra
note 89, the experience of the Florida bar-related company indicates that premiums
could be reduced substantially without impairing profitability. See Payne, Title
Inmurance and the Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy, 53 MiNx. L. Rnv.
423, 465 n.135 (1969). But differences in accounting procedures, overhead costs,
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policy is required to be purchased in any event because the additional cost
of procuring the simultaneous issuance of an owner's policy is extremely
small, and in the case of at least one major North Carolina company, there
is no additional cost.'0 9 It seems almost incredible that, even in cases
where a lender's policy was being required, less than twenty per cent of
our respondent attorneys encouraged home buyers to obtain owner's
policies.
The second most frequent reason given by our respondent attorneys
why they did not encourage the purchase of owner's title insurance was
that "it is not my role to sell title insurance." It might be observed that
one's perception of his role may be heavily influenced by self-interest and,
further, that the attorneys of Florida, who operate their own bar-related
title insurance company, take a greatly different view of the attorney's
role as a title insurance salesman."10 Of more importance is the fact that,
even in North Carolina, it is indisputably clear that the attorney's role is
to protect the interests of the client who is purchasing real property, and
particularly is this true in regard to the state of the property's title.
If the attorney pretends, or permits his client to assume, that a record
search accomplishes full title assurance, he has in effect made a misrepresentation to a person to whom he owes a fiduciary duty-a grave
matter, to say the least. If the attorney does not wish to sell title insurance, he should at a minimum explain comprehensively and clearly
the costs and the benefits of procuring insurance and the risks the buyer
is assuming by electing to go uninsured.
Several of the reasons suggested by the questionnaire for not encouraging the purchase of title insurance turned out to be insignificant in
the judgment of the attorneys. For example, only half of one per cent
of the respondents felt that title insurance companies were too unwilling
to pay claims-a response which suggests either that the companies are in
fact highly cooperative or that most of the respondents had had so little
and tax treatment may weaken any comparison between commercial and bar-related
companies. This point needs further detailed study.
"' Letter to approved attorneys of First Title Insurance Co. (undated; issued in
Spring 1970). This company now makes no additional charge for a lender's policy
when an owner's policy is purchased at the usual premium rate for lender's insurance-basically two dollars and fifty cents per thousand.
".See generally Yelen, Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund: The FloridaExperience,
51 A.B.A.J. 1070 (1965). The Florida bar has been resoundingly criticized in title
insurance circles for the obvious conflict of interest inherent in the selling by the
lawyers of a product in which they have a financial interest. See, e.g., Rosenberg,
The Lawyer's Role in a Real Estate Transaction,46 TriTn- NEws 64 (No. 1, 1967).
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experience with claim procedures that they have no ground for objecting
to them. Only one per cent stated "I regard it (title insurance) as an
affront to my competence as an attorney"; perhaps our respondent attorneys passed over that answer simply because it seemed too venal when
read on the printed page. The author has heard the sort of sentiment it
embodies expressed by a good number of North Carolina lawyers in
personal conversation.
Only three per cent of the attorneys responding indicated that "the
application papers require too much time and attention." Whether this
objection to title insurance is justified is difficult to assess since the
companies' forms and papers vary substantially in their complexity and
detail. Perhaps one reason the attorneys did not find the paperwork
objectionable is that a good many of them charge an additional fee for
doing it. Twenty-nine per cent of our respondents indicated they made
an extra charge for applying for a lender's policy, and thirty-one per cent
charged an additional fee for procuring an owner's policy. In both cases,
the amount of the extra fee most frequently mentioned was twenty-five
dollars, an amount which would seem more than adequate to compensate
for the time of the attorney's secretary consumed by the drudgery of
filling out almost any imaginable form.
One possible reason for the unwillingness of attorneys to encourage
the purchase of owner's insurance was not listed on the questionnaire,
primarily because it was felt that no attorney would admit to being
influenced by it: a fear of being sued for malpractice by a title insurance
company. It is interesting to speculate about whether the attorney's risk
of a negligence suit is more or less serious when title insurance has been
procured. If the attorney has carelessly failed to inform the title company
of a particular defect and the company must later respond to a claim by
the insured and pay off the defect, it obviously has a subrogation claim
back against the attorney. What are the probabilities of the attorney
actually having to make good on this claim, as contrasted with the situation
in which there is no title insurance and the owner or mortgagee makes a
claim against the attorney directly? There are no concrete data, but it
seems quite probable that the attorney's position is better with the title
insurance company in the picture. A company that has a continuing and
profitable relationship with the attorney is much less likely to proceed
against him than is the buyer whose only contact with the lawyer may
have been this particular transaction and who does not understand the risks
and peculiarities of title defects in any event. Of course, if the company
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has paid a sufficiently large claim and the attorney appears able to stand
the loss, the company may sue him. But under the approved-attorney
system, the goodwill of attorneys is an immensely valuable asset of the
title insurance companies, and a company may well conclude that it is
wiser to absorb a loss of a few hundred, or even a few thousand, dollars
than to pass that loss on to the attorney at the cost of large numbers of
referrals from him in the future. Subrogation actions by title companies
against attorneys are not common, but, on the other hand, they are not
unheard of."-' Not one of the nearly two hundred attorneys responding to
our questionnaire had himself been subjected to a claim by a title company, but twenty-four per cent stated they had heard of a claim asserted
against another attorney in the county.
The discussion in the paragraph above assumes that the attorney has
considerable power to select the particular title company that will get a
specific piece of insurance business. The data collected from the attorneys
responding to our questionnaire bear out this assumption. The average
estimate of those attorneys was that the buyer chooses the particular title
insurance company in only 1.7 per cent of the cases. This result is hardly
surprising since the vast majority of buyers probably have not the slightest
knowledge of which companies write title insurance within the state. The
responses to our questionnaire estimate that the attorney selects the particular title company to write the insurance in about thirty-four per cent
of the cases, and the lender chooses the company in the remaining sixtyfour per cent of cases. A number of the respondents commented that
whether the choice would be made by the attorney or the lender would
frequently depend upon whether the particular lender involved in a transaction had a title insurance company as an affiliate or subsidiary.
In cases where such a relationship between lender and insurer exists,
it appears common for the lender to specify that its affiliated insurance
company be used. Such a practice raises severe ethical problems for the
attorney, as well as issues of fairness regardless of the attorney's position.
If only a lender's policy is to be issued and the underwriter is an affiliate
of the lender itself, it is strongly arguable that the title insurance premium
is nothing more than a subtle mechanism to increase the lender's yield
on the loan. In the event of a title failure, the position of neither the
borrower nor the lender (disregarding the subtleties of its corporate
structure) is improved in the slightest by the presence of the so-called
...
See, e.g., Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co., 300 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1952),
danmages modified on rehearing, 317 F.2d 56 (1963).
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title insurance. In reality, the lender has elected to become a self-insurer,
and the borrower has paid a premium for which he has received no consideration whatever except the granting of the loan itself. The situation
may thus raise issues of usury.
Although in situations where no lender-operated title company is
involved the attorney clearly has great opportunities for pushing business toward one title insurance company or another, there appears to
be little actual corruption in this system. Only 2.6 per cent of our
respondent attorneys stated that they ever received rebates or fees from
title insurance companies in return for sending policy applications.
Such rebates would raise ethical questions of grave dimensions and
might be analogized to the cases of physicians who also operate pharmacies."'
A fair summary of the impact of title insurance on the title bar is
that, far from being corrupted by the title insurance system, attorneys
have failed to become educated as to its advantages to their clients and
themselves, a condition which has unfortunate consequences for the
protection of the buyers of real estate within this state.
Other Title Assurance Means
There are several other methods of title assurance that are theoretically operable in North Carolina, although none of them have major
significance. It is customary to use a "full" warranty deed--one containing all possible covenants of title. But because recovery on such
covenants depends upon the continued availability and solvency of past
grantors in the chain of title, deed covenants form an uncertain and
unsatisfactory mode of title assurance that is likely to be asserted only
as a last resort.
The law of adverse possession also forms a bulwark of title assurance in certain cases. But adverse possession does not solve a long
list of title problems," 8 and when one considers the difficulties frequently encountered in adducing the necessary evidence of possession for
the statutory period, the inevitable conclusion is that adverse possession
is at best a limited and specialized form of title assurance.
There is one further mode of title assurance which, if widely
adopted, would probably go far toward squeezing out both the lawyers
and the title insurance companies in the conveyancing field. This is the
...
See articles cited at note 110 supra.
See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
...
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Torrens registration system under which the title to land is represented by a certificate similar to those currently used for motor vehicles.
The state of the title as it appears on the face of the certificate is conclusive for most purposes, and conveyancing is handled by endorsement
of the certificate by the grantor.114 During the 1930's the Torrens
system was widely heralded by commentators as a panacea to conveyancing problems," 5 but it never really caught on and is virtually a dead
issue today. North Carolina is one of twelve states which still authorize
Torrens registration of land titles,".6 but the system is not widely used.
Only five per cent of the attorneys responding to our questionnaire stated
that they had ever registered title to land under the Torrens system,
and only one attorney had registered as many as eight titles. The statewide applicability of this response may be questionable on grounds of
geographic bias; the author has learned from personal conversations with
attorneys in the eastern portion of the state that a number of large
timber and mineral firms do procure Torrens registration of their holdings, presumably because adverse possession cannot run against a Tor7
renized title."1
The most important reason for the unpopularity of the Torrens
system in North Carolina is probably the initial cost of registration,
which requires a thorough title search by a court-appointed examiner
and a judicial proceeding comparable to a quiet title action."" Not many
private purchasers of land are interested in spending the extra fee for
this proceeding, which would likely run to several hundred dollars and
which does the registrant himself very little immediate good. Other
reasons for the system's lack of wide usage include the paucity of North
Carolina appellate decisions interpreting the Torrens statute, its unfamiliarity to lenders, and the obvious reluctance of attorneys and title
companies to promote a system which seems ultimately to be against
their interests.
" See generally R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 919-23 (abr. ed. 1968) ; Patton,
The Torrens Systent of Land Title Registration,19 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1935).

..See, e.g., McDougal & Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression,
L.J. 1125 (1939); McDougal, Title Registration and Land Law Reform:
A Reply, 8 U. CEi. L. REv. 63 (1940).
921 (abr. ed.
. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 43 (1966) ; R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
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1968). An exasperating feature of the North Carolina terminology is that both
Torrenization and conventional recordation are called "registration." See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 47-20 (1966).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 43-21 (1966).
...
.8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 43-11 (1966).
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Handling the Closing
Upon completion of his preliminary title search, the attorney prepares to superintend the closing. If there is existing indebtedness on
the property, the holder of the debt is contacted for information regarding its principal balance and interest. The amounts of such prepaid items
as rents, taxes, and hazard insurance premiums must be learned so that
they may be prorated between buyer and seller. When this information
has been accumulated, a closing statement is prepared by the attorney or
by the lender in cases where a new loan is being made. Then the closing
is held and attended by the attorney, the parties, the broker or salesman,
and a representative of the new lender. The necessary instruments and
checks are signed and endorsed, and the proceeds of the sale are disbursed, as appropriate, to the seller, previous lender, and broker. Following the closing, the attorney takes the new deed and deed of trust to
the courthouse for recordation.
Although this brief explanation makes the procedure seem straightforward, it actually raises at least two problems that may be exceedingly
serious. The first involves the discharge of a pre-existing debt with the
proceeds of sale of the property. Assume the simple case in which one
owner-occupant is transferring his house to another. Suppose that the
existing debt represents a loan originally made to the present seller of the
house by a local mortgage company. Assume further that that mortgage
company has sold the loan to an out-of-state institutional lender, a Virginia life insurance company, for example. The borrower has been given
no notice of the assignment of the note and deed of trust and has continued to make his payments regularly to the mortgage company believing that it continues to be his creditor. The mortgage company is in
reality acting now as collection agent for the insurance company and has
remitted the borrower's payments to it after deducting some agreedupon servicing fee. The situation thus described is entirely typical.
When the property is sold, the attorney disburses to the local mortgage company the amount necessary to discharge the existing indebtedness; he, like the other parties, has no knowledge of the assignment
of the note and deed of trust since that assignment is unrecorded. The
mortgage company happens to be in serious financial difficulty and does
not remit the loan payoff to the insurance company; rather it uses the
money in a last-ditch effort to stave off insolvency-an effort which
unfortunately fails. The insurance company, as actual holder of the
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note, now notifies the seller of a default in payment and ultimately proceeds to foreclose on the realty.
In defending against the insurance company's action, the attorney
for the buyer may argue that the agency relationship between the mortgage company and the insurance company was so close that the payment
to the mortgage company should be attributed to the holder of the note,
thus discharging the debt. One North Carolina case supports this
argument," 9 but in future cases the precise facts involved are likely to
be crucial in judging the argument's continuing validity. Issues likely
to arise include the exact relationship of mortgage broker to holder,'
the negotiability of the note,'" and the depth of inquiry made by the
attorney. 2' The present point, however, is that the attorney has, in
effect, invited this litigation and is probably going to have to defend it.
The closing attorney could have readily avoided the problem by
requiring the delivery of the existing note to him for cancellation before
disbursing the funds to pay off that note."2 The law is quite clear that
the attorney may not rely on the public records in determining the
identity of the present holder of the note; the mortgage company's assignment may be fully effective despite of lack of recordation.2' The questionnaire asked the attorneys whether they required delivery of the
existing note for cancellation before disbursing funds; about one-third
replied that they always did so, another one-third said that this was their
usual practice, and the final one-third stated that they did so only if
convenient. A number of attorneys commented that their practice would
vary depending on their estimate of the apparent holder's trustworthiness and solvency; if the record holder were a large and reputable firm,
the attorney would be more inclined to disburse funds before delivery
Assurance Soe'y of the United States v. Lazarus, 207 N.C.
"175Equitable
63, 612
S.E.
705 Life
(1934).
Cf.
American
Sec. & Trust Co. v. John J. Juliano, Inc., 203 Va. 827, 127
S.E.2d 348 (1962) (no agency relationship).
121 See G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 233-34, 236-38 (1951).
1" See Clinton Loan Ass'n v. Merritt, 112 N.C. 243, 17 S.E. 296 (1893)

(where note is non-negotiable, only a reasonable inquiry into the identity of the
present holder is required). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Sauls, 183 N.C. 165, 110
S.E. 865 (1922) (where non-negotiable note assigned, but mortgage is not, payment12 to original mortgagee is sufflicent to discharge debt).
A similar situation exists if payment is made to the trustee of a trust deed
rather than the beneficiary. The payment is insufficient (in the event of defalcation
by the trustee) unless he was expressly authorized by the beneficiary to receive
payment. Monteith v. Welch, 244 N.C. 415, 94 S.E.2d 345 (1956) ; Wynn v. Grant,
166 N.C. 39, 81 S.E. 949 (1914).
...
See G. OS ORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 236-38 (1951).
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of the note. Perhaps this is an appropriate area for the making of a
professional judgment by the attorney, but it seems more strongly
arguable that, in light of the enormity of the loss which might be
suffered in the situation we have described, the better practice would be
invariably to require delivery of the note for cancellation before disbursing funds. It seems probable that a good many attorneys handling
real estate closings are not aware of the risks created by this situation.
Another serious problem is created by the time lapse between the
attorney's preliminary title search and the recordation of the closing
documents. Suppose that, following the closing, the attorney takes the
new deed and deed of trust to the Register of Deeds for recordation.
Before handing the documents to the clerk, he makes a quick update of
the title and discovers that on the previous day a one-thousand-dollar
judgment lien was docketed against the seller of the property. 2 ' What
course of action should he follow?
Precisely this question was asked to the attorneys receiving the
survey questionnaire. Many of them seemed quite at a loss; the most
frequent answer ran something like the following: "I would stop payment on all checks until the matter had been resolved." This seems at
least a good starting point, but unfortunately it will be impossible in
many such transactions. In another portion of the questionnaire, we
asked the attorneys in what order they disbursed funds and recorded new
documents. Sixty-three per cent replied that they customarily made
disbursal of funds to the seller and previous lender before making that
fateful trip to the courthouse. If the seller is aware of the judgment
lien and the trouble it will cause, he is likely to cash his check for the sale
proceeds very quickly after the closing is completed, quite probably
before the attorney has discovered the lien. Stopping payment would thus
prove ineffectual.
If the seller has given a deed with full covenants of title, his position
is probably indefensible in litigation; the existence of the judgment lien
would violate a covenant against encumbrances, and the seller, if he has
sufficient assets and remains available in the jurisdiction, will be liable
to discharge the lien. But it is not hard to envision the seller, as he
cashes his check, deciding that this is a propitious moment to take that
. 25A number of lawyers (clearly not a majority) try to avoid the problem by
making a final down-date of title within a few hours before closing. This procedure
reduces the risk of intervening title defects, but does not eliminate it, and the inconvenience of the extra trip to the courthouse is obvious.
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long-awaited extended vacation in Mexico. And even if the seller is
available for suit, it appears that a damage action for breach of title
covenants is the only remedy available to the buyer. In the absence of
fraud, rescission and other conventional contract remedies are not open
here 20 because of the infamous doctrine that the title covenants of the
contract of sale are merged into the deed.' 7 Title, it would seem, has
passed to the buyer at the time of delivery of the deed subject to what,ever defects may have arisen between the time of the attorney's initial
search and the closing. The list of possible defects is impressive: to name
a few-mechanics' liens, federal tax liens, easements, and the like incurred by the seller during those last few days before closing; and if
we are willing to imagine a really evil seller, the list could include a sale
to another purchaser made the day before the closing of our transaction
or perhaps a mortgage made to a cooperative lender for one hundred per
cent of the property's value. 128 There is no suggestion in the North
Carolina law that the attorney may be treated in this situation as an
escrowee or that title does not truly pass until the final search is made
and the deed recorded. On the contrary, it seems perfectly clear that
title passes and the contract is merged into the deed when the closing
is held.
At a minimum, then, North Carolina attorneys ought to do what
nearly two-thirds of them are not now doing: they ought to withhold
disbursal of all sale proceeds until the final check of title has been made.
2' See R. PoWELL, REAL PROPERTY
902 (abr. ed. 1968); 7 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRAcrs § 929 (Jaeger ed. 1963).
121If defendants

did not mean to be bound by their covenants, they should not
have included them in their deed. Execution and delivery of the deed containing full covenants established the extent of their obligations thereunder.
It is presumed that the prior sales contract and all prior negotiations leading
up to closing of the sale, insofar as they related to any matters covered by
the covenants in defendants' deed, became merged in the deed itself.
Gerdes v. Shaw, 4 N.C. App. 144, 150-51, 166 S.E.2d 519, 524 (1969). See also St.
Clair v. City Bank & Trust Co., 175 So. 2d 791 (Fla. App. 1964); Holihan v.
Rabenius Builders, Inc., 355 Mass. 639, 246 N.E.2d 638 (1969); Annot., 38
A.L.R.2d 1310 (1954).
128 Under the Connor Act, North Carolina's "race" recording statute, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 47-20 (1966), such a purchaser or mortgagee who pays value and records
first will prevail despite actual knowledge that the property is subject to an
executory contract of sale. New Home Bldg. Supply Co. v. Nations, 259 N.C. 681,

131 S.E.2d 425 (1963); Lawson v. Key, 199 N.C. 664, 155 S.E. 570 (1930);

Duncan v. Galley, 199 N.C. 552, 155 S.E. 244 (1930). The contract buyer's only
mode of protection would be to have his contract acknowledged and recorded, a
rare practice and one many legitimate sellers would find objectionable because of
its effect of clouding title in the event the sale is not consummated.
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Even this procedure will not avoid untidy litigation nearly as well as
does an escrow, a concept with which most North Carolina attorneys
appear to be unfamiliar. In a true escrow, the parties deliver all documents and checks to a stake-holder with instructions that title is to pass
only when certain conditions have been fulfilled-typically, the delivery
to the escrowee of the other party's papers or money; the approval by the
buyer of the state of title; and the computation of prorations, closing
charges, and payoffs of existing indebtedness. 2 When all conditions
have been fulfilled, the escrowee "closes" the escrow by recording the
appropriate documents and disbursing the proceeds. Title does not pass
until the last condition is fulfilled, 3 ' so it is possible to defer the passage
of title until the final down-date of the attorney's search with recordation
taking place immediately thereafter. Since both of these activities occur
in the Register of Deeds office, there need be no time gap at all between
them.
Although the escrow concept sounds foreign and cumbersome to
many North Carolina attorneys,' 3 ' it is in fact a great simplification of
present procedures, primarily because it removes the necessity for having
a formal closing with the parties physically in attendance. The depositing
of the documents and money with the escrowee may take place at any
time after the "opening" of the escrow and prior to the date set in the
escrowee's instructions for closing; the items need not be deposited with
the escrowee simultaneously. If the parties have entered into a mutually
enforceable contract of sale, the escrow has a further advantage: once
a party has deposited his papers or money with the escrowee, neither his
unwillingness to proceed with the transaction, nor his incompetence, nor
even his death will prevent the escrow from closing and a valid transfer
I" See generally Comment, The Independent Escrow Agent: The Law and The
Licensee, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 289 (1965). In California virtually every real estate
sale is closed through escrow, and the escrowees are regulated by statute. Escrow
case law is more fully developed in California than any other jurisdiction. Escrows
are also widely used in the Chicago area. See Bukoll, PracticalAspects of Escrow,
33 Cai. B. REc. 355 (1952); Mann, Escrows-Their Use and Value, 1949 U. ILL.
L.F. 398.
130 Board of Educ. v. Union Dev. Co., 159 N.C. 162, 74 S.E. 1015 (1912).
A number of North Carolina cases recognize and approve the escrow concept. See, e.g., Vinson, Jones & Finch v. Pugh, 172 N.C. 843, 90 S.E. 122 (1916);
Board of Educ. v. Union Dev. Co., 159 N.C. 162, 74 S.E. 1015 (1912) ; Sutton v.
Davis, 143 N.C. 474, 55 S.E. 844 (1906); Craddock v. Barnes, 142 N.C. 89, 54
S.E. 1003 (1906). See also American Serv. Co. v. Henderson, 120 F.2d 525 (4th
Cir. 1941) (escrow of personal property); Bond v. Wilson, 129 N.C. 325, 40 S.E.
179 (1901) (held no evidence that depositary was intended to be an escrowee).
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of title taking place.' 32 There is thus a strong incentive for the parties
to comply in good faith with the contractual obligations they have
assumed.
The escrow device is not the only way to solve the time-lapse dilemma. In some states it is customary to actually hold real estate closings
in the courthouse. A down-dating of the title can be accomplished by the
lawyer and the documents delivered and submitted for recordation immediately thereafter. Such a procedure is safe but obviously inconvenient
in many cases, especially in counties in which there are major towns
in addition to the county seat. Our questionnaire responses suggest that
courthouse closings are rarely held in North Carolina. Instead, the
lender's office is the usual place of closing when a new loan is being
made by a savings and loan association. Where a bank or mortgage
company is making a new loan, about two-thirds of the closings are held
in the attorney's office and the other one-third in the lender's office. A
shift to courthouse closings is neither probable nor desirable; it comes
off a rather poor third when compared with the escrow device and the
present practice.
CONCLUSION

The whole tenor of the data adduced by our survey is that the 'buyer
is the forgotten man in the typical real estate conveyance. 3 ' Although
the attorney usually purports to represent him, the buyer is neglected in
virtually every phase of the transaction: in negotiation with sellers and
lenders, in having the complexities of the transfer explained to him, in
receiving adequate assurance of title (or even a cogent explanation of
the ways in which his title assurance could be fortified), and in the
" This result is based on a fictional "relation back"; when the last condition
is fulfilled, the passage of title is said to relate back to the time the documents were
originally deposited with the escrowee. Incapacity or change of intent by any party
after that time is immaterial. See Law v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 91 Cal. App.
621, 267 P. 565 (1928); Craddock v. Barnes, 142 N.C. 89, 54 S.E. 1003 (1906)
(dicta). This result follows only if the escrow is based on an enforceable contract
of sale. See House v. Lada, 180 Cal. App. 2d 412, 4 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1960); Aigler,
Is a Contract Necessary to Create an Effective Escrow?, 16 Micu. L. Rav. 569
(1918). But the escrow instructions themselves, if in writing, may constitute the
necessary memorandum of contract. Wood Bldg. Corp. v. Griffitts, 164 Cal. App. 2d
559, 330 P.2d 847 (1958).
..Other scholars, using different methodologies, have reached the same conclusion in other jurisdictions. See Hammer, Title Insurance Companies and the
Practice of Law, 14 BAYLOR L. Riv. 384 (1962); Payne, 101 Home Buyers: The
Consumer, The Conveyancing Process, and Some Questions of Professional Conduct, 16 ALA. L. Rav. 275 (1964).
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manner in which the actual transmission of title is handled. It is
fatuous to suppose that property buyers will organize and lobby for
changes in the system. They are, almost by definition, unorganized.
The average buyer is likely to be involved in only two or three realty
transactions in a lifetime. Thus, the imposition of the "system" upon
him is sporadic, and unless he is involved in a purchase at a given
moment, he is not likely to become excited about reform. Indeed, only
the more sophisticated buyers or those who are actually stung by title
defects are ever likely to recognize the sorry nature of the "representation" they have been given. Yet buyers do recognize that the costs of
realty title assurance and transfer greatly exceed the analagous costs
in personalty transactions, and they will patronize alternative providers of title and transfer services if they seem to be less expensive than
the lawyer's methods.
Who, then, will press for reform? In North Carolina, the answer
must inevitably be the organized bar. Unlike the situation in many
other states, the bar here is involved in nearly every real estate transfer;
its position is pre-eminent and its expertise widely accepted. Moreover,
the present system raises serious ethical problems for attorneys, and
members of the bar have become increasingly concerned about them.
Ideal reform of the conveyancing system ought to resolve these problems and, at the same time, regain for the consumer some of the protection he expects and deserves. These matters will be the subject of
the second part of this article, to appear in the next issue of this volume
of the Review.

